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NASA's Project Management Development Process
by Dr. Edward J. Hoffman
Professional development has always been a major
concern at NASA, but until recently there has been
no systematic process for the development, growth
and improvement of the Agency's people working on
projects.
Ten years ago NASA established the Program
Project Management Initiative (PPMI) to provide
project management development in advance of
need. Over the years, PPMI has met the needs of
thousands of NASA employees. In recent years
greater emphasis has been placed on having a more
systematic, Agencywide process for the development
of people in projects.
In order to establish a systematic process which
would best represent NASA and meet the demands
of our workforce, a study was conducted to deter-
mine the components of an effective development
process. The researchers interviewed over 150 peo-
ple from five NASA Centers at various stages of
their careers. The central finding of this study was
the need for a NASA project management develop-
ment process that would be voluntary, nonbureacrat-
ic, open to many, and involve a minimum of paper-
work.
In August of 1993 the results of the full-scale Career
Development Research Study were published. The
study, titled Career Development for Project
Management, was designed to create an empirically
based foundation for the Project Management
Development Process (PMDP). A shortened version
of this document was published in the Winter 1994
edition of Issues in NASA Program and Project
Management, NASA SP-6101 (08).
Out of this significant study came the four-level pro-
fessional development chart (Figure 1) for people in
projects, which has been widely reprinted. More
directly, this study led to NASA senior manage-
ment's recommendation to establish and institution-
alize the Project Management Development Process.
The PMDP, formally established in 1995, has
received a great deal of interest from other govern-
ment agencies and industry, as well as international
organizations.
While communicating the PMDP and receiving ideas
for implementation, General Spence "Sam"
Armstrong, Associate Administrator for Human
Resources and Education, and I visited each and
every NASA Center. What we found was a great
depth of concern for fairness and equity in the devel-
opment of program and project managers. Loud and
clear, the predominant concerns were that NASA
management would openly support and communi-
cate such a process for NASA employees, and that
the PMDP not result in a system which forced Center
managers to hire project managers who have only
gained "checklist" qualification. It should be neither
a barrier nor a guarantee of promotion, but rather a
wide-open, professional enhancement opportunity.
In January of 1995 a group of NASA project man-
agers and human resources management profession-
als met with PPMI staff at Kennedy Space Center to
plan the launch of PMDP. This group refined and
expanded the developmental experience and training
recommendations described within the two PMDP
handbooks. (Both the participant and supervisors
PMDP handbooks are available through local train-
ing offices, as well as through the NASA PPMI web
site: http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/HR-Education/
training/ppmi.htm.) The group also refined the
PMDP structure found in Figure 1, showing the
preparation and four levels of accomplishment, plus
the reviews needed for advancement to ongoing pro-
fessional development.
Note that PMDP is a process, not a program or prod-
uct, and it is open to senior managers as well as to
new hires and mid-career NASA employees. The
development process is ongoing. It is also important
Pre-PMDP
Figure 1. PMDP Levels of Accomplishment.
to keep in mind that PMDP is not a training process;
rather, it is a development process for enhancing crit-
ical competencies associated with the work of people
in projects. With this direction, PMDP encourages
gaining competency through appropriate and specif-
ic work assignments which are supplemented by
well-timed training and development rotations and
assignments.
The Project Management Development Process
became official on August 22, 1995, when General
John R. Dailey, Acting Deputy Administrator, noti-
fied officials at headquarters and directors of field
installations. In part he wrote:
"During this time of dramatic change at NASA, it is
critical to reemphasize the importance of our career
development programs for our employees. We must
maintain our commitment to the future by supporting
the ongoing learning and necessary work and train-
ing experiences of the NASA workforce. It is the
responsibility of each Installation to support mem-
bers of the project management community in
receiving the proper experiences during their career.
"Over the past two years, we have instituted many
efforts within NASA to codify a more consistent
approach for managing our projects. As part of these
efforts, the Program Management Council has been
established to review major programs, and NMI
7120.4 (Management of Major System Programs and
Projects) has been enhanced to better reflect the cri-
teria for the effective management of our major pro-
grams and projects.
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"To successfully implement these changes, we must
communicate and institutionalize these project man-
agement standards to make them a natural compo-
nent of how we do our work. A key vehicle for
assisting this integration is the PMDP. The PMDP is
an Agencywide professional development process
for employees interested in project management. It
will assist employees with identifying work and
training experiences beneficial to their professional
development. In addition, it will also support a more
consistent application of successful project manage-
ment practices across NASA. There are significant
benefits for both NASA and our employees."
Shortly after General Dailey's announcement, mate-
rials describing the process and startup procedures
were sent to the training and development office and
to senior management at each NASA installation.
Included were a 14-minute videotape, guidebooks
for both participants and their mentor or supervisor
and an Individual Development Plan (IDP) advisory,
listing potential ways to gain specific skills and
experiences.
PMDP Guidelines
To support the PMDP, a participant handbook and a
supervisor handbook were created. Both guidebooks
begin with a description of the Project Management
Development Process, including the three main goals
of strengthening "the consistent application of suc-
cessful project management practices" across all of
NASA, providing "clear information" about profes-
sional development opportunities in the Agency, and
identifying "work experiences, training and develop-
mental assignments" which enable people in projects
to enhance their competencies and support career
development goals. The PMDP is not a selection
process that limits future selection, nor is it a guar-
antee of future promotion. It is intended to support
the enhancement of professional capabilities and
growth, not to preselect future managers or limit pro-
motion opportunities to a select few.
PMDP is a "tool" to assist the NASA employee in
development planning. Its starting point and frame-
work is the employee's Individual Development
Plan, a projection of the applicant's career objectives
along with the on-the-job work requirements to be
supplemented by training and work assignments.
The IDP is worked out in conjunction with a super-
visor and, if desired, a mentor who will guide the
employee through the PMDP. An IDP can be a
Center-specific process, the NASA process or an
approach the individual and immediate supervisor
support.
The mentor and/or supervisor will ordinarily begin
the process by asking the applicant to fill out a
Record of Accomplishment (RoA), which will help
each of them to determine where the employee is in
terms of professional development. The RoA is a
simple form, not unlike a resume or curriculum vitae,
listing relevant education, work experience, training
courses and other accomplished development oppor-
tunities. There is a sample RoA page within the par-
ticipant handbook. It is the development of this RoA
or listing of work and educational experiences that
provides the individual and the supervisor with the
information necessary to discuss an appropriate ini-
tial level of entry into the PMDP. More important
than the initial level, however, is the fact that the
RoA forces a person to take the time to document
specifically the past experiences which establish a
skill mark and visually supports the person in plan-
ning for future goals.
During the initial planning process the supervisor
should provide honest feedback about the employ-
ee's accomplishments, skills and areas of growth. In
addition, a mentor may be extremely useful for pro-
viding guidance of expertise which the supervisor
might not have. It is important to keep in mind that
the intent of this process is not to ascend to the high-
est level possible; the objective is to document the
experiences gained to date honestly and clarify indi-
vidual competencies, areas for growth and specific
steps for enhancing competency. The PMDP should
open up a window of needs and concurrent opportu-
nities for gaining competencies.
Both the RoA and the IDP are simply professional
development tools. Completion of the forms is not
an end in itself nor a contract for advancement.
Emphasis should always be on the development
process, not merely filling out forms and getting
3
themsigned. (In fact, the intent is thatafterthe ini-
tial establishmentof anRoAanda IDP,documenta-
tion andmaintenancebecomesimple.)
To assistthe employeein building the Individual
DevelopmentPlan, the PPMI hascreatedthe IDP
Advisor, a 34-page handbook with iocator that pro-
vides specific examples of potential work experi-
ences and training recommendations for each of the
four levels. The IDP Advisor is intended as a cata-
lyst of potential activities, not a prescription. It will
also be periodically updated to reflect management
changes and offer new ideas.
Management Development Process
At the heart of PMDP are the core competencies for
each of the four levels. Within each level are knowl-
edge, skills and competencies clustered within the
following eight general factors:
• organizational knowledge
• technical knowledge
• technical management
• project life cycle and program control
• contract acquisition
• individual and team development
• Agency, business and international relations
• risk management and safety
As can be seen in the four-level competencies chart,
hands-on technical expertise is emphasized in Level
One, while broad leadership competencies are
emphasized increasingly up through Level Four.
Typically, Level One is considered entry level after
one to three years of basic discipline development
and work experience. It focuses on hands-on engi-
neering tasks. One critical component is under-
standing NASA guidance on the management of pro-
jects as documented in the soon to be released NPD
7120.4 (and concurrent handbook). Also considered
critical to job performance in terms of organization-
al knowledge is some kind of understanding of and
experience with the NASA Project Life Cycle. The
supervisor and/or mentor may specify the observa-
tion of at least one program review per phase local-
ly, plus several observations of project life cycle
reviews with the Center director or directorate.
In the technical area, hands-on hardware/software
operations are deemed critical, along with configura-
tion management systems and procedures, plus qual-
ity assurance. Over a period of three or four years,
the entry-level candidate is expected to develop thor-
ough technical knowledge in his or her discipline,
and participate in both operations analysis and
research activities.
Three core training experiences are required for
Level One candidates, each related to a correspond-
ing work requirement. The Program Control
Overview course relates to Project Life Cycle devel-
opment activities, while Systems Engineering and
Task Management enrich the technical program flow
as well as cost and scheduling work requirements.
(Be aware that the Task Management course is called
by other titles at local Center offerings, typically
Project Leadership Simulation.) Several other PPMI
courses are encouraged, depending upon the candi-
date's work schedule and experiences. The funda-
mental idea is to make theory and practice mutually
beneficial. As the one informs the other, the candi-
date in Level One obtains a broad foundation of
knowledge and experience necessary for systematic
career development.
Level Two candidates, on the other hand, typically
find themselves gaining valuable experience as a
technical expert or as a leader on small subsystems
or instrumentation projects. Their required courses
are Project Management and Program Control
Overview. At this point the candidate should be
designing, developing, testing and reviewing hard-
ware/software at the test bed and system level. He or
she may serve as the leader of a matrixed team, and
lead team meetings.
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Their knowledge of issues in interagency and inter-
national relations can be enhanced through work
assignments, task teams and possible rotations. The
candidates should by now be writing reports,
requirements and Statements of Work (SOWs) for a
subsystem. At this level they are encouraged to
enhance their managerial skills because they will be
assuming more managerial duties, with their com-
munication and interpersonal skills becoming more
important.
Level Three reflects a systems manager perspective.
A candidate is expected to manage a systems-level
project, including contractors and NASA team mem-
bers. The individual manager is usually responsible
for contract management, developing and monitor-
ing master schedules, maintaining budget control,
preparing a Program Operating Plan (POP) and man-
aging the overall system life cycle. The project man-
ager at this level is seen as an Agency resource and
may be asked to serve NASA-wide boards.
The Advanced Project Management course must be
completed before completing Level Three. Courses
in management and Performance Measurement
Systems are encouraged, along with the Project
Management Shared Experiences Program offered
every other year.
The PMSEP is also encouraged for participants in
Level Four, along with the Senior Executive
Program. Work or developmental experiences
require knowledge for NASA's political environment
and strategic planning, as on Level Three.
At Level Four people are expected to interface with
all project implementation organizations internal to
NASA (Mission Assurance, Engineering, Opera-
tions, Acquisition) and external organizations (indus-
try, academia, international partners, and U.S. gov-
erning bodies). They are expected to manage and be
held accountable for the entire program or project
which they are leading.
In terms of individual and team development activi-
ties, Level Four people should become adept in man-
aging people (including recruitment, human resource
development, coaching, mentoring and personnel
evaluation) and teamwork (including team selection,
motivation, rewards, empowerment and conflict res-
olution). They will be known for their decision mak-
ing skills, creative problem solving and trou-
bleshooting experiences. Working across Agency,
Center and international lines, they learn to deal with
other cultures and handle external factors which act
on any project.
Of course, not everyone who chooses to enter the
PMDP process will want to move through all four
levels. Our NASA history and past practices show
many talented, successful scientists and engineers
have found their niche, working on technical tasks,
managing small projects or balancing laboratory
work and management.
Others will choose to progress through the ranks and
up the four levels of accomplishment. They will
enter the PMDP, meet with their mentor and/or
supervisor regularly, plan their training and profes-
sional development activities, discuss their IDP and
document their progress in their RoA, and make
adjustments to the IDP at least annually, until the
career objectives are fully achieved.
Moving from one level of achievement to the next
higher one also involves a minimum of paperwork
and procedure. First of all, a candidate's supervisor
has the authority to recommend individual place-
ment up to Level Two. To begin Level Three, how-
ever, the supervisor will have to submit a completed
IDP or RoA from Level Two to the Installation PMC
Panel for review and approval. Level Four entry
requires the same procedure, plus concurrence from
the Center Director and the Agency-level PMC. In
each case, the Center's human resource organization
will receive a copy of the revised IDP and complet-
ed RoA. Upon completion of each level the individ-
ual will receive an Agency certificate of recognition.
For this to happen, the interested candidate must
make sure that the local human resource department
has forwarded the candidate's name to the NASA
Office of Training & Development. Candidates with
questions about this can call this office at
202-358-0300.
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The primary responsibility for professional develop-
ment rests with the applicant. We tried to keep the
PMDP process as self-directed and self-monitored as
possible, with plenty of assistance from mentors,
supervisors and the PPMI. We have developed
PMDP handbooks for the supervisor/mentor as well
as the participant, and we ask that the applicants
themselves who choose their mentors, if any, com-
plete and process the documentation such as their
own IDP and RoA, and that they schedule all meet-
ings with mentor and/or supervisor for guidance and
feedback.
Likewise, the Program Management Council sets
policy Agencywide for the PMDP and approves
entry into Level Four. Our Headquarters PPMI
Office coordinates the Agencywide project manage-
ment training program in support of the PMDP and
continues to periodically evaluate the PMDP as it
relates to the quality of project management within
NASA. With all this attention at various levels of
NASA management, constant revision, upgrading
and improvement of the PMDP process is expected
as conditions change and as the needs of the Agency
evolve.
The Installation Panels at the third and fourth levels
set policy for the Center's PMDP to ensure fair and
consistent treatment for all participants. They also
approve "graduation" to the next level of accom-
plishment.
With the increasing emphasis around the world on
core competencies for project managers, the PMDP
provides unlimited opportunities for NASA project
managers to plan and manage their own future.
Better Decisions Through Structured Analysis
Better Decisions Through Structured Analysis:
Overcoming the Subjective Tendencies of the
Human Mind
by Morgan D. Jones
As a Central Intelligence Agency analyst of Soviet
space programs in the late Sixties and early
Seventies, I was constantly challenged to estimate
the capabilities and intentions--past, present, and
future---of these programs. I believe a fair review of
my work in those years would show that most of my
analytic judgments were on the money• But on those
(dare I say "rare") occasions when I erred, as we
humans are prone, I would review my analysis to see
where I had gone wrong. Invariably I discovered
that, for whatever reason, I had given insufficient
consideration or weight to the alternative course of
action which the Soviets had chosen.
I may have estimated, for solid and justifiable rea-
sons, that a certain Soviet program would move in a
particular direction.., and it didn't. Or I may have
estimated a program would not move in a particular
direction.., and it did. As we all know, one learns
little from being right, and volumes from being
wrong. And what I learned from my "rare," always
galling, analytic failures was that, despite my keen-
est efforts, I had not been objective in my analysis•
Do a quick exercise with me. Think of someone
with whom you work closely every day.
Now visualize that person's face and recall the
last time you spoke with him or her.
Now imagine that you read a newspaper article
alleging this person has embezzled a great deal of
money from your organization.
What is your instant reaction?
You immediately formed an opinion, didn't you?
"That person is incapable of stealing?" Or, "Yeah,
that person could be an embezzler." Or something
else.
Have you ever wondered why we humans impul-
sively take sides on issues? Why can't we approach
problems objectively, without instantly harboring an
opinion about them? The answer, provided by cogni-
tive science, is that the human mind is programmed
to be opinionated, to be biased, to think subjectively.
In other words, we are incapable of being objective
•.. try as we might•
Consider the following sequence of numbers: 40-
50-60- What is most likely the next number?
70, of course• Buy why 70? There is an infinite num-
ber of alternatives, some quite intriguing, as in 41-
51-61, 50-60-70, and so on. Yet, even though we
may consider these alternatives, 70 will remain our
preferred choice, because our minds instinctively,
unconsciously perceive "40-50-60" as a pattern and
are captured by it. And there's absolutely nothing we
can do to un-capture it. Why? Because that's the
way the human mind works•
This simple exercise demonstrates that the mental
machinery with which we think is inherently flawed:
The Human Mind is Incapable of Being Objective. If
the mind were really objective, it would not be capti-
vated by the 40-50-60 sequence, and it certainly
would not favor 70 as the next number over the lim-
itless, more creative and more interesting alterna-
tives. (Immanuel Kant, the great 18th Century
philosopher, theorized that the mind is not designed
to give us uninterpreted knowledge of the world, but
must always approach it from a special point of view
•.. with a certain bias.)
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Wearealwaysproneto favor one sideor anotherof
anissueor problembecausewe interpretthatissueor
problemthroughthelensof biasesandmindsetswe
acquirethroughour life's experiences. The mind,
unbiddenandwithout ourconsciousawareness,cre-
atesthesebiasesand storesthem away in memory
wherethey serveasunconsciouscontrollersof the
myopic,custom-madementallensthroughwhichwe
view andinterprettheworld aroundus.
Our propensityto take sides--to think subjective-
ly--is evidentin thefact that wehumanscommonly
"begin" our analysisof a problemby formulating
our "'conclusions." We thus start at what should be
the "end" of the analytic process. Therefore, our
analysis of a problem usually focuses on the solution
we intuitively favor. Accordingly, we pay inade-
quate attention to alternative solutions; we look for
and put store in evidence that supports our favored
solution while eschewing evidence that does not, and
at time we even maintain our support of the favored
solution in the face of incontrovertible, contradicto-
ry evidence. The human mind really is a piece of
work!
So what can we do about it? Or are we condemned to
be ever victimized by our troublesome mental pro-
clivities?
There are two things we can do. First, we can quit
thinking that we're objective analysts. We are not.
Humans are simply not objective. Second, we can
organize--structure--our analysis in a way that
ensures each element, each factor, of a problem is
analyzed separately, systematically, and sufficiently.
There are many different ways to structure analysis.
My most recent book, The Thinker's Toolkit:
Fourteen Skills for Making Smarter Decisions in
Business and in Life, describes some proven ones:
problem restatement, pros-cons-and-fixes, sorting,
chronologies, causal-flow diagramming, matrices,
decision and probability trees, weighted ranking,
hypothesis testing and utility analysis. All such tech-
niques, by separating the elements of a problem in a
logical, organized way, enable us to compare and
weigh one element against another and to identify
which factors and relationships are critical. Most
importantly, these techniques compensate for the
mind's lack of objectivity by compelling us to sys-
tematically consider alternative options and scenar-
ios. Failure to consider alternatives is a principal
cause of faulty analysis.
Structuring is to analysis what a blueprint is to build-
ing a house. Building a house, building anything,
without a plan is, to say the least, ill advised. And
what structuring is to a blueprint, the techniques of
structuring are to a carpenter's tools--not compo-
nents of a unified system for analyzing problems but
an assortment of techniques that can be used singly
or in combination.
Finally, structuring is not a substitute for thinking. It
is rather a means to facilitate and empower thinking.
Used properly and creatively, techniques for struc-
turing will significantly enhance our ability to ana-
lyze, understand, and solve problems, lead to more
effective analysis and sounder decisions, and make
us feel better about those decisions.
Devil's Advocacy
One of the easiest structuring techniques--and a
highly effective one--for countering our subjective
tendencies is Devil's Advocacy, which seeks to prove
a contrary or opposite view to the one that is favored.
The power of devil's advocacy resides in our uncon-
scious compulsion to favor an outcome or solution
early in the analytic process. By artificially favor-
ing--focusing on--a contrary or opposite view,
devil's advocacy activates our instinctive, subjective
modes of thinking: paying insufficient attention to
alternatives, looking for and putting store in evi-
dence that supports the facile view and holding fast
to the view in the face of contradictory evidence.
Devil's advocacy is thus indifferent to the favored
view, and that is the technique's principal strength--
freeing the analyst to seek and obtain new evidence
which was not sought in analyzing the favored view
or, if obtained, was not believed. This thirst for, and
receptivity to, evidence that contradicts the favored
view is devil's advocacy's secret weapon, the extra
dimension that makes it a formidable analytic tech-
nique.
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It's easy to apply devil's advocacy because we don't
have to learn any new analytic approach or device.
We just follow our natural inclinations and let devil's
advocacy do the rest. But there is always strong
resistance, both within the analyst and within a peo-
pled organization, to taking, or even recommending,
the devil's advocacy approach.
Imagine that you have just come up with a great idea
for making your company rich, for which your career
and pocketbook will benefit handsomely. How psy-
chologically motivated are you to find and give cre-
dence to evidence that your idea won't work or that
some other idea will make the company greater prof-
its? Not much. Or imagine that a senior manager in
the company has conceived of a promising new ven-
ture and is pushing it. How receptive will that man-
ager be to a proposal to gather and analyze evidence
showing that the venture as originally conceived is
flawed or that another venture offers greater
promise? The very idea of undertaking a devil's
advocate approach is naturally interpreted as threat-
ening to those who have endorsed the primary (the
favored) view.
Consider the hypothetical case of a large manufac-
turing company which, despite aggressive advertis-
ing, is faced with rapidly declining sales of its prin-
cipal product. The company's management has
determined there are essentially two options: contin-
ue production of the product with modifications to
improve its appeal, or terminate production. If I
were the company CEO, I would establish two com-
peting working groups, one to seek evidence in sup-
port of continuing production, the other to seek evi-
dence in support of termination. I would charge each
group with presenting their findings to the board of
directors, which would then make the decision. To
assign these two inherently conflicting analytic tasks
to a single working group would be tantamount to
letting a single lawyer both prosecute and defend
someone in court.
We can, of course, employ the devil's advocate
approach even when we are doing the analysis our-
selves, alone. We simply work one view of the prob-
lem and set our conclusions aside for a day or two to
let our focus, mindset, and bias relax and fade a bit.
We then go to work on the other side, trying to prove
just the opposite with different evidence.
Whether conducted by competing groups or a single
individual, devil's advocacy will, with virtual cer-
tainty, open the mind of the analyst to new dimen-
sions and perceptions of the problem, poking holes
in fallacious, self-serving arguments and stripping
away poorly reasoned and thinly supported evidence.
That's the wonder and delight of the devil's advocate
approach.
Separating Utility and Probability
Another troublesome feature of our minds is our ten-
dency, when analyzing and discussing options for
solving a problem, to address what we seek to gain
from a particular course of action (that is, the utility
we see in it) at the same time that we address the
probability that this course of action will produce the
desired outcome. Separating the analysis and dis-
cussion of utility and probability is essential to
objective analysis, because these are fundamentally
different subjects, each with a different focus and,
especially, a different language. Issues are raised
and positions voiced in analyzing utility that are
absent in analyzing probability, and vice versa.
Utility Question: If we implement "Option A"
and "Outcome X" occurs,
what is the utility (the benefit,
the advantage)?
Probability Question: If we implement "Option A,"
what is the probability
"Outcome X" will occur?
Listen, when colleagues discuss alternative courses
of action. They will casually, unconsciously, switch
back and forth between utility and probability, often
in a single sentence, blissfully unaware they are
doing so and unaware of the consequences.
The district manager has convened a meeting of her
sales staff. "Sales of our Super FAX 5000 are slip-
ping," she declares. "What can we do about it?"
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Jack: "Offer complimentary rolls of FAX
paper.
Manager." "Not a bad idea. That might interest
some customers [Utility], but it probably
wouldn't last [Probability]."
Jill." "How about offering extended mainte-
nance warranties ?"
Manager." "I like that. The 5000 is very reliable, so
it wouldn't cost us much [Utility]."
Jill." "It might [Probability] even save us
money [Utility]."
When we mix elements of utility and probability
together, we confuse the issues and muddy the ana-
lytic waters because the assumptions, biases and pre-
conceived notions that drive our assessment of utili-
ty are entirely different from those that drive our
assessment of probability. Our assessment of utility
determines which option is most attractive. Our
assessment of probability determines which outcome
is most likely. In other words, utility determines
what we want, probability what we get.
To avoid the adverse consequences of intermingling
these two basic components of analysis, I recom-
mend addressing utility first, by asking the Utility
Question of each option: If we implement the option,
what benefit, profit, or advantage does its outcome
provide? Then rank the options by the comparative
utility of their outcomes. Spend some time at it.
Ignore the probabilities for the moment. You'll be
amazed at how focusing your mind on just utilities
empowers your thinking. When you are comfortable
with your rankings, then and only then address the
probability of these outcomes by asking the
Probability Question. For example:
Utility Rankings of Probability of
Desired Outcome Desired Outcome
Option C
Option A
Option E
Option B
Option D
10%
5O%
70%
40%
9O%
You will find that separating analysis of options into
two steps is easy because it simplifies the process
and, as I said, empowers the mind by enabling it to
focus on one element at a time: first utility, then
probability.
But then what? How do we combine the utility rank-
ings with the probabilities? We do it with an inge-
nious device called Expected Value. We compute
expected value by multiplying the utility of an out-
come by its probability of occurring. This is easily
done if utility can be expressed in terms of dollars.
But if it can't, we quantify utility on a scale of 0 to
100, where zero is the least utility and 100 the most.
We then multiply the utilities by their probabilities to
determine their expected values.
Utility Value of Probability of UxP=EVDesired Outcome Desired Outcome
Option C 90
Option A 70
Option E 30
Option B 20
Option D 10
10%
50%
70%
40%
90%
90x .1 =9
70 x .5 = 35
30 x .7 = 21
20 x .4 = 8
10x .9=9
In our example, Option A is strongly preferred. It is
noteworthy that neither the option with the most ben-
eficial outcome (Option C: 90) nor the one with the
most likely outcome (Option D: 90%) emerged as the
favorite. Option C had too little probability, and
Option D had too little utility. By integrating utility
and probability into a single quotient, Expected
Value affords us a powerful and reliable means of
evaluating, comparing and ranking options.
The only way to learn devil's advocacy, utility analy-
sis or any other structuring technique is through
practice. So try it. You'll be surprised how structur-
ing opens up the complexities of a problem and pro-
duces valuable insights into its solution. Such is the
power of structuring your analysis.
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TechTracS
TechTracS: NASA's Commercial Technology
Management System
by Kevin Barquinero & Douglas Cannon
In response to the Administration's technology pol-
icy, the National Performance Review and the
needs of our nation's industries, NASA
Administrator Daniel Goldin issued NASA's
Commercial Technology: Agenda for Change in
July 1994. The Agenda for Change outlines the
national technology policy, Agency decisions made
to implement the national policy, and the Agency's
newly defined Commercial Technology Mission.
This paper explains the mission and TechTracS, the
program's commercial technology management
system.
Since its inception, NASA has recognized that the
technology it develops in the course of its missions
has relevance to the general economy.
Consequently, the Agency has maintained a technol-
ogy utilization program to transfer this technology to
industry, but this early program had at best a passive
relationship with industry. NASA disseminated its
technical information routinely and reacted to com-
pany inquiries as they came up. Serendipity was the
"management system."
Today, economic development is an important
national goal. Marketing NASA technologies, creat-
ing new business practices for entering into partner-
ships with industry, establishing and reporting met-
rics, creating and updating an electronic network to
better serve our customers, and implementing a
training program to educate NASA employees to
effect change in our culture are the main elements of
the new, proactive commercial technology program.
Taken together, these activities represent a funda-
mental shift in how the Agency works with industry
to commercialize its aeronautics and space technolo-
gies. No longer is NASA relying on serendipity.
Rather, the Agency is actively working to move our
knowledge from our programs and laboratories
through companies to the marketplace.
The core process in this new way of doing business
is "knowledge management." NASA civil servants,
contractors and grantees frequently create new
knowledge of technology during its aeronautics and
space missions that has commercial value embedded
in it. First capturing and then managing this knowl-
edge are the most critical functions of the commer-
cial technology offices at each field Center. Without
control of our technical knowledge we are handi-
capped in our ability to maximize the number of
NASA-industry collaborations. Conversely, having
a complete database of all NASA technology invest-
ments, along with an assessment of the commercial
potential of these technologies, will greatly enhance
the process of matching NASA technologies with
industry needs. Spurred on by NASA's 1995
Strategic Plan calling for a 100% inventory of NASA
technology for commercial potential, a small team
set out to develop this knowledge management sys-
tem.
TechTracS Management Stages
The purpose of TechTracS is to identify and capture
all NASA technologies with commercial potential
into an off-the-shelf database application, and then
track their progress. As such it is, in essence, an
"asset management system" much like those found
in successful corporations. This management system
consists of four stages:
The first is to develop an inventory of the
Agency's entire technology portfolio and
assess it for relevance to the commercial mar-
ketplace. NASA has already established an ini-
tial operating inventory database and is one of
the first agencies to do so. The commercial
assessment is the responsibility of each NASA
associate administrator and is conducted by the
field center managing the technology activity.
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Thosetechnologiesthat are identified ashav-
ing commercialpotentialwill thenbeactively
marketedto appropriateindustries.This is the
secondstage.Makingour technologyinvento-
ry availableover the Internet is a key stepin
this stage. Suchvaluable information is thus
deliveredquickly andevenlyto all whoseekit.
Thethird stageis whenaNASA-industrypart-
nershipis enteredinto for thepurposesof com-
mercializingthetechnology.Thesumtotalsof
NASA's contributionto thesepartnershipsare
tallied to show progress in the partnership
requirements specified by the National
PerformanceReview.
Thefinal stageis to trackthetechnology'ssuc-
cessor failure in the marketplace.While this
systemis initially aimedat leveragingNASA
technologiesinto the marketplace,it can also
be used to better leverageour technologies
acrossNASA's internal missionsas well as
technologiesacrossnationalinitiatives involv-
ing multiplefederalagencies.
In addition to thesestages,TechTracS will track a
number of other management processes such as
patent execution, license negotiation and TechBriefs
abstract preparations in order to assure complete
transfer of NASA technology.
Assessment and Inventory
Technically, TechTracS is a distributed network of
relational databases located at each NASA field
Center and Headquarters. It is a client/server archi-
tecture that has user-friendly interfaces and is plat-
form independent. It was developed for NASA by a
small team at the Research Triangle Institute using
ACI US' 4th Dimension TM client/server relational
database. It is a virtual office that enables coopera-
tive data management and services such as metrics
analysis, Internet services, automated documents and
letters, ad hoc reports, on-line clients, email services
and multimedia capabilities.
The effectiveness of TechTracS is evident by
NASA's success in meeting its strategic goal of
assessing I00 percent of its technologies for com-
mercial potential. Working with the comptroller's
office and the procurement office, we successfully
merged their respective databases, each Center's
technology database, and a newly developed partner-
ship database into a single relational database in
TechTracS. For the first time NASA's entire FY
1995 budget of $14 billion was correlated with its
procurements, technologies and partnerships (which
account for nearly 90% of the Agency's budget).
For any given year NASA manages over 10,000 con-
tracts, grants and cooperative agreements ranging
across over 25,000 program areas. When combined,
these create a matrix with more than 50,000 areas of
unique work tasks which are then allocated to 10
field Centers and Headquarters. These 50,000 work
areas represent an annual NASA investment of
approximately $12 billion. This entire structure and
its set of relationships are modeled in TechTracS.
From July 1 to September 1, 1995, we assessed more
than two-thirds of these 50,000 areas. In that time,
2,700 new technologies emerged and approximately
10 to 15 percent of these areas have been assessed as
having commercial potential. More than $600 mil-
lion or about 5 percent our annual investment in
these work areas qualify as technology partnerships.
This is the first time that a Federal agency has con-
ducted such an extensive inventory of its programs
and technologies for technology transfer. The initial
results are impressive, but as we improve our report-
ing system and when both NASA staff and the pub-
lic become more knowledgeable of it, we believe we
will increase the annual number of new technologies
created by a factor of three over the next five years.
We also believe the percentage of our programs and
technologies with commercial potential will increase
to 25 percent over the next five years. Finally, by
1999 we expect to increase the amount of resources
we invest annually in partnerships from 5 to 20 per-
cent.
Partnerships and Tracking
TechTracS offers benefits beyond its enhancement of
internal commercial technology management. It
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makes possible customer services that heretofore
were impossible to offer. First, and most important-
ly, companies now have an easy-to-use, searchable
database to locate NASA technologies that may
solve their problems, wherever that knowledge may
be--at a NASA lab, a contractor facility, or a univer-
sity. Making the human connection between the
knowledge owner and the knowledge seeker is the
first order of business in technology transfer.
TechTracS accelerates this process.
The next step in technology commercialization is that
a relationship must be established between NASA
and the knowledge-seeking company. Once this rela-
tionship is established, relevant information regard-
ing the new partnership is stored in TechTracS. The
National Performance Review expects 10 to 20 per-
cent of NASA's budget to be in R&D partnerships
with industry. Because of TechTracS, the Agency is
able to report accurately to the Administration its
progress towards meeting this goal.
While partnerships are a measure of the relevance of
NASA technology to the U.S. economy, they do not in
and of themselves contribute to the economic well-
being of the nation. Companies must take the NASA
knowledge they acquire and apply it in a new or
improved commercial process, product or service.
For NASA, success occurs when the company makes
new capital investments, creates new jobs, and/or sells
new and improved commodities in the marketplace.
TechTracS is able to capture these "success stories."
With immediate access to this data, NASA will be
able to demonstrate to the Congress and the American
people the relevance of its investment in aeronautics
and space for advancements in science, technology,
and contributions to the United States economy.
FY 1996 Goal: Training
With the assessment of NASA's entire investment
base complete and ongoing, the next goal for the
NASA team is to train individuals to take advantage
of this system. Two strategies are being pursued:
• In partnership with NASA's executive training
professionals, an internal training course is
being developed for NASA civil servants, con-
tractors and grantees. This course will be part
in a series of NASA training opportunities that
instruct NASA managers, scientists and engi-
neers on the importance of the Commercial
Technology Mission, mechanisms for entering
into partnerships with industry, TechTracS's
role in tying this all together, and how to use
TechTracS's information system.
In partnership with the TechTracS industry
team, a similar training course is being devel-
oped for companies most likely to benefit from
NASA's technology transfer. Like its in-house
counterpart, this course informs the partici-
pants of NASA's Commercial Technology
Mission and partnership options. In addition, it
will train these individuals on how to access
the publicly available portions of TechTracS
remotely so that they can seek information
about NASA technologies on their own for
their benefit or on behalf of a customer.
Industry training is key to the commercial exploita-
tion of this information. No single individual, team,
organization or network of organizations has enough
knowledge to maximize the transfer and commer-
cialization of NASA technology throughout the U.S.
economy. The economy is simply too big and too
complex. However, many individuals, joint teams,
multiple organizations and even networks of organi-
zations can maximize the transfer and commercial-
ization of NASA technology throughout the U.S.
economy together. TechTracS training is the empow-
ering tool. Upon completion of this course the atten-
dees will receive a NASA certificate attesting that
they understand NASA's Commercial Technology
Program and are skilled in using TechTracS to locate
NASA commercial technology.
The continuing evolution of NASA's commercial
technology management system can be a major fac-
tor in such industrial advances and economic devel-
opment. Success stories will hopefully become com-
monplace. In analyzing those success stories,
TechTracS should be able to illustrate the value and
importance of placing the right technology knowl-
edge into the right hands at the right time.
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Are We Missing Something ?
Today's Management Technique and Tools:
Are We Missing Something?
by Ernest M. Hahne
For decades, bookstore shelves have been filled with
all manner of business guidance and management
philosophy. Today we can choose from hundreds of
software programs that, taken together, claim to be
the solution to any management problem in any man-
ner of approach. Every month our mailbags are
overloaded with offers for better training or more
effective consultation and business reengineering
support.
With this much help, why do so many of us and our
organizations continue to perform below par? Have
the gurus of management science missed something
that we all need to know? Is problem solution just
"too hard," given the complexity of modem business
and government requirements?
I do not believe it's "too hard." I do believe some-
thing has been overlooked. This paper describes an
approach that was used to uncover this missing link,
formulate a solution approach and test solution
validity against in-process program needs rather than
in a rarified laboratory environment.
Test/demonstration results indicate that we do not
need to develop any new management principles.
Rather, we need only to change our technique and
some processes we use for application of existing,
well-known principles. This rearrangement of tech-
nique and process application does require some
modification and addition to our management tool
set. However, revolutionary change is not called for
and may, in fact, be counterproductive.
Identifying the Missing Link
Several study reports concerning numerous program
failures within NASA, the DoD and industry in gen-
eral prompted a search in the late 1980s for a miss-
ing management process link? Based on the author's
personal experiences as a program and systems man-
agement practitioner and consultant, an obvious
question arises: Why do so many ventures that
appeared sound at startup continue to report "sur-
prising" indications of pending or actual failure?
How can this be, given industry's significant invest-
ments in employee training, skills, hiring and acqui-
sition of the "latest" in management information sys-
tem (MIS) capability? What, specifically, goes
wrong?
A similar question was asked in the mid-1960s by a
small government team tasked to improve the exist-
ing program acquisition and management practices. 2
This team (with the author as a participant) reviewed
numerous programs such as the FB-111, C5A and
MinuteMan. We developed a lessons learned list of
common reasons for major program problems. The
list (unpublished at that time) was used as a guide for
the creation of the MIL STD-499 Systems
Engineering Management and early versions of the
DoD 7000.2 Cost/Schedule Control Systems
Criteria. The similarity between the data reported in
the 1980s and in the 1960s list was very evident.
A direct correlation yielded surprising results. The
only difference between the two was the increased
length of the 1980s list? The 22 new items, resulting
in a new total of 59 Failure Lessons Learned, related
primarily to software development and integration,
and the rest to funding issues. In the 1960s relative-
ly few programs had significant software content,
and funding was not the issue it is today. However,
what was the explanation for the rest of the list? A
sample of the expanded list is illustrated in Figure 2.
Two approaches were addressed to explain the
repeatability. The first, involving a validation review
of existing techniques and processes, was rejected as
time consuming and probably fruitless. Too many of
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ushave"beenthere,donethat."Theapproachtaken
wasto searchfor aroot cause,startingwith thefun-
damentalsof the overall program/productionand
operationsmanagementprocess:specifically, how
organizationsconvert input dataand raw materials
intoproductsandservicesthatareeconomicallyuse-
ful to anenduser. Fundamentally,this wasa repeat
of a 1966study(conductedby theauthor)thatresult-
ed in a principle of managemententitled "System
Duality.TM
Program Failure Lessons Learned
I Inadequate requirement specifications as part
of the RFP severely compromise the overall
acquisition effort and the quality of the
delivered product.
Complete Interface Control Specifications
between hardware and software and software
are critical.
Adding manpower is rarely a solution to
development schedule problem correction.
4 Training contractor and user personnel is
essential.
5 Program management cannot specify good
development criteria and just expect good
development to happen.
6 Inadequately defined user requirements result
in inadequate system/software specifications
that lead to a contractually acceptable product
that is operationally deficient.
7 Close and continuous monitoring at detailed
schedule levels is essential. Risk Management
needs should drive the level of detail.
Senior Management must be knowledgeable
and involved in contract performance.
Communications and related documentation is
critical to effective program configuration
control and completion, i.e., ICWGs, minutes,
telephone logs, Product Development
Handbooks, etc.
10 Key personnel and management turnover
causes critical problems.
Figure 2. Program Failure Lessons Learned (Early 1990
Compilation).
The System Duality concept states that management
always deals with two interrelated systems, as illus-
trated by Figure 3. One is the organizational system
(O) responsible for product production; the other is
the product system (P) itself that is intended to satis-
fy the end user needs.
The concept also states that the key element of man-
agement control over the process was the Transform
Function, as illustrated by the overlap of the O and P
systems. Thus, management control metrics would
encompass planned versus actual cost, schedule and
technical performance data, describing the (O) sys-
tem conversion of inputs to deliver a product (P) to
the user.
The author's re-evaluation of the concept supported
its validity as described, and as applied by practice.
Industry has reams of processes available to address
all elements of Figure 3, with two exceptions. These
are highlighted in Figure 3 by the items contained
within the dashed boxes. These two items appear to
be the missing link within our management process-
es. Specifically, the absence of predictive and inte-
grated risk analysis concerning the probability that
our plans will fail at some significant cost and, also,
our failure to assure timely review and feedback on
developing results to the end user. In today's com-
mon practice, user feedback usually comes too late
for easy design change. Essentially, the risks have
already been incurred.
Risk Management Planning
Risk may be defined as the exposure to some likeli-
hood of experiencing some loss. A loss can be
expressed in many ways, such as a capability, eco-
nomically, in terms of time, politically, socially, etc.
The operative word in the definition is some. Loss
magnitude can range from trivial to catastrophic.
Loss occurrence can range from low to very high
probability. Losses that do occur are usually addi-
tive.
There is always a likelihood of experiencing some
loss. For previously demonstrated things, both the
loss likelihood and magnitude may be known with
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User Requirements
Assemblies
Components
Information
etc.
User
Inputs
Organization (System
"0")
• Equip_nt
Expendables
• "P" is an "0" Output
• "0" Transforms Expendables into "P"
• "0" Consists of Non-expendables
User
Need
Satisfaction
Metrics
Figure 3. System Duality Concept.
reasonable accuracy. For things not demonstrated, a
significant range of uncertainty may exist concern-
ing not only both parameters, but also the mecha-
nism responsible for the exposure.
Another finding from the Figure 3 study was that
many causes for program failures appeared as the
result of planning errors of omission. Items 1 and 6
on the Figure 2 list exemplify this. The complete list
provides several additional examples of planning
inadequacy that suggest the need to change our basic
planning concepts.
First, we must admit that our biggest planning prob-
lem is that we don't know what we don't know at
process startup. The author and others call this the (I
DON'T KNOW) 2 problem. If we don't know that an
issue exists, how can we possibly plan to avoid it?
Fortunately, there are many tools available that, if
used properly, would surface critical planning ques-
tions. Unfortunately, too many of us do not use them
or are unaware of their existence.
One such tool is the list represented by Figure 2. Its
use as a checklist is extremely valuable for risk
avoidance planning. Several other similar tools will
be described later.
Another concept we should embrace involves the
notion that in the absence of risk, management
becomes basically unnecessary. Stated another way,
we should conclude that the primary purpose of man-
agement planning is to provide a roadmap and mea-
surements for avoidance and/or control of risks that
attend development of any new product. On aver-
age, most of us currently practice reactive risk man-
agement. We must change our practice to emphasize
preplanned or predictive risk management.
Another challenge to conventional thinking is that
risk taking is bad. We can advance only by taking
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risk. The key hereis that any risk takenmust be
affordable.
Finally, wemustall realizethat predictiverisk plan-
ningrequiresagreaterinvestmentof time, skills and
experience.Numerousstudiesshowthat significant
paybackcan result when an upfront investmentis
dedicatedto moredetailedplanning. Figure4 illus-
tratesdatafrom two suchstudies.
Theaboverecommendedchangesto our conceptual
planning approachesare illustrated pictorially in
Figure5. Our currentapproachis illustratedat the
top left. Wehavea plan for conceptA with noup-
front risk assessment.Implementationresultsare
illustratedattheright. Notethat"surprise"risk loss-
esarea significantpart of total cost,that total cost
exceedswhatwasplanned,andthatapartof planned
valuewaslost dueto riskshavingoccurred.
Justbelow we show the sameConceptA plan but
haveincludedrisk assessment.Note that total cost
now includestheriskcost. Of course,theadvertised
costis higherthanonethatdid not includerisk costs.
Wouldthesecondplanandprice beawinner?
An alternativeplan (ConceptB) including its risk
costsis shownat thebottomof Figure5. Note that
total cost as illustratedis physically smallerthanA
above it and also that the risk budget is smaller.
Planned value results remain approximately the same.
(B results from trade studies that improve the baseline
of A.) This figure illustrates the objectives that man-
agement techniques and tools are intended to achieve.
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Figure 4. Cost of Poor Planning.
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Figure 5. Risk Planning Concept.
Systems Engineering: A Primary Risk Analysis
Technique
Risk analysis has a clearly definable starting point.
Specifically, that point includes complete and quan-
tified definition of end user needs, related constraints
and measures of effective user results. This is an
iterative process. The existing classical processes
for systems engineering provide the foundation for
performing predictive risk analysis and planning.
This process starts with the end user needs and con-
cludes with the assured delivery of an acceptable end
product.
This paper does not address systems engineering
process applications for resolution of all risk analy-
sis needs. The applications that are addressed focus
on how risks within a design concept are surfaced
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and how relative measurements can be made con-
cerning their probability of occurring and the magni-
tude of loss if they occur. These relative measure-
ments will serve as a flag and guide to management
for their investment of resources and attention to
avoid or control each identified risk.
An overview of the systems engineering process as
commonly discussed in most publications _ is shown
in Figure 6. Note that risk analysis is one of many
supporting functions to the centralized functions of
system evaluation, trade studies and optimization.
Conclusions concerning the repeatability of the
Figure 2 Program Failure Lessons Learned suggest
that Figure 6 should be revised as shown in Figure 7.
These revisions should aid future system engineering
practice as needed to achieve predictive risk plan-
ning and more certain risk control. All suggested
revisions can be correlated to one or more Program
Failure Lessons Learned.
Revision 1: Insert risk analysis within the central-
ized function block. As a supporting function, many
interpreted it to be a standalone requirement.
Mission _ Functional HAnalysis Analysis
Requirements
Allocations DesignSynthesis
System Evaluations, Trade Studies, Optimizations
I I__
Engineering Effectiveness Life Cycle Risk
Specialties Models Cost Model Analysis
_._ SystemDefinition
Producibility Logistics ISupport Model
Figure 6. The Classical System Engineering Process.
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Mission ,_J _unct,on., U_..u,r...nt. LJ °'"" H SystemAnalysis Analysis 12--[ Allocations J3_l Synthesis Definition
Syste m:val uati:nd,_ASt_ydii:s, Optim_ons
Engineering
Specialties Effectiveness I
Models
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Cost Model Producibility
y
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9 Support Model I
Figure 7. Suggested Revisions to the System Engineering Process.
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Factually, that is how it is treated throughout today's
DoD 5000 Series, NHB-7120, and most other publi-
cations. The transform function, previously shown
in Figure 3, requires that risk analysis must be inte-
grated within and across all functions.
Revision 2: Add the end user as a major function at
the process beginning. Most of us overlook the crit-
icality of this function to systems engineering suc-
cess. Initial user inputs should only be introduced to
block 1, Mission Analysis. Future inputs should be
introduced into both block 1 and block 5, System
Definition. Feedback should only emanate from
block 11.
Revision 3: Clarify that all communications between
the centralized and supporting functions are two-way,
and for new problems, real time. Use double ended
arrows. These paths contain the data for process
direction, authorization and reporting of process
problems and results. Real time communication con-
trol is critical to effective conduct of the Successive
Refinement Process of Systems Engineering. (Avoid
surprises at major progress reviews.)
Revision 4: Annotate block 5, System Definition, to
emphasize that the purpose of the entire process is to
select a best alternative based on a trade study among
alternatives. Too many programs fail because the
trade study was inadequate or not conducted.
While the actual performance of a trade study is usu-
ally complex and difficult, the fundamental concept
is easy. (See Figure 8.)
State
a
Need
J ,
Develop a
Candidate
Solution
___ Improve
the
Candidate
Develop a
New
Candidate
Revise the need
2 Quantify the 3
Solution vs.
r Quantified
Need
r
I
I Acquire the
' Candidate
Solution
7
8
Quit
Figure 8. A Simple Trade Study Process.
Revision 5: Add Configuration Management (CM)
as an administrative support process within systems
engineering. CM should not function as a decision
authority for change or approval. Reserve this role
for the centralized authority of block 11. Also, all
trade study data should be controlled under CM.
Trade study results and decisions are totally depen-
dent on the assumptions made and the analytical
technique used. If these data are not available for
future change analysis, chaos can result.
Trade Study and Risk Planning
Effective risk management depends on trade study
performance and trade study is the heart of systems
engineering. Systems engineering and risk manage-
ment are totally intertwined.
If a first pass through steps 1 to 4 don't yield a yes (it
usually won't), exercise paths 5, 6 and 7 singly or in
parallel. At this point block 4 becomes the trade
study function where the best of all available choic-
es is tested for acceptability. If a yes is not obtained,
repeat 5, 6 and 7 or decide you have no acceptable
solution approach and go to path 8 "Quit" or No Bid.
Obviously, a first step is to define an initial candidate
solution that demonstrates feasibility for satisfaction
of end user needs. Since this paper is primarily
about techniques that avoid or mitigate risk, three
major recommendations must be made concerning
step one. First, obtain every scrap of detail available
concerning user needs, related constraints and mea-
sures of minimally acceptable performance of the
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Figure 9. A Typical Candidate System Design Matrix.
product/system to be delivered. Help the user create
this data if it is inadequate. Second, make sure that
only highly skilled engineers experienced in the dis-
ciplines needed for initial solution definition are
assigned. Third, avoid elegance in first cut
approaches. Emphasize substance of need and why
off-the-shelf solutions may be inadequate for user
need satisfaction. Failure to adhere to the above rec-
ommendations will increase startup cost and may
result in unforeseen life cycle risk in resulting pro-
gram plans.
Design Synthesis
Creating the initial system solution candidate
requires most of the functions of the System
Engineering process illustrated by Figure 7. Initially,
blocks 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 are most critical. Difficulty in
creating their data products suggests that team expe-
rience may be inadequate or that for block 4 the
existing technological art is too limited. The latter
issue represents a major risk that is discussed later.
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Without belaboring how the Figure 7 processes are
performed, the synthesized system concept that
results from block 4 could result in a model as shown
in Figure 9. At the top left are stated user needs
(ra to rc) that initiate the analysis process and defin-
ition of specific system functional requirements, fl
through f5. These functions are allocated to subsys-
tem B I, B 2 and B 3. Further functional decomposi-
tion occurs and, as shown for B 2, these subsystem
functions are allocated to end items C l, C 2 and C 3.
They provide the capabilities to perform the system
and subsystem functions: for example, Ca and Cb for
end item C j.
A basic feasibility test of this synthesized design is
conducted by asking the following questions:
. Can end item capabilities, as identified, be rea-
sonably satisfied by existing or new equipment
known to be undergoing development?
. Are there obvious reasons why the end items
within the model would be difficult to produce or
support logistically?
° Are there difficult and perhaps unacceptable
engineering specialty issues related to reliability,
maintainability, human factors, safety, etc., con-
cerning any of the end items or their integration?
4. Are the end items high cost? Is the schedule for
their availability reasonable?
A negative response to one or more of the questions
requires repetition of the Figure 7 process until two
or more alternative synthesis models that demon-
strate feasibility of satisfaction of end user needs are
defined.
Note: If at least one feasible candidate cannot be
defined, stop work. If this is due to unavailable tech-
nology, consider initiating an R&D project.
Establishing plausibility of each feasible design fol-
lows the Figure 7 process but emphasizes efforts
through blocks 7, 8, 9 and 11. These activities are
complex, time consuming and relatively expensive.
The Program Failure Lessons Learned List items
(Figure 2) suggest they are among the most poorly
performed systems engineering activities. However,
without some reasonable data input from them,
effective performance of the block 11 trade study is
hopeless.
Experience has shown that designing for perfection
is infinitely costly and time consuming. Also, given
the rapid growth of technology while we are design-
ing, it's probably impossible. We need to change our
selection and approval paradigm from a search for
what's best, to a search for what is "least bad" but
acceptable for satisfaction of known needs.
I do not suggest eliminating classical system effec-
tiveness and life cycle cost analysis processes. I do
advocate doing them only in areas where user need
satisfaction would be significantly impaired by their
absence. For any other purpose they tend to waste
resources and time.
The following sections present a "poor person's
approach" to resolution of these measurement needs.
Risk Management Decision Making
The proposed poor person's approach emphasizes
the drawing of management decision attention to
what most of us call grey areas.
Critical issues are usually obvious early on. (They
can be enhanced by the judicious use of past lessons
learned checklists.) Once known, they are sometimes
given more attention than deserved.
Small issues are often set aside, as they should be,
unless their impacts can be shown to grow.
The vast majority of issues are somewhat vague and,
unless prioritized relative to their potential contribu-
tion to end user need and risk, consume vast amounts
of management time and "self-protection" funding.
In addition to prioritization, another concept drives
implementation of the poor person's approach.
Rigorous mathematical analysis is often no better
than relative magnitude estimation by an expert.
Management decision making requires a "go/no-go"
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approach to metrics, not the precision that results
from sophisticated and often computerized methods.
The latter are usually costly and add little extra
value.
Following is an application example of the poor per-
son's approach to decision making, using an example
solution candidate matrix based on the simple model
shown previously in Figure 9. This measurement
application example is shown in Figure 10.
Measurement begins at the upper left with user defi-
nition of value for each stated requirement. (For this
discussion, limit this to value statements concerning
mission functional requirements shown as ra, rb and
rc.) Measurement ends at the lower right of the fig-
ure. This is where the engineer ranks the ability of
available or soon to be available end items (hardware
or software) proposed to provide the capabilities
required to support satisfaction of mission function-
al requirements. In between are subsystem alloca-
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Figure 10. A Typical Candidate System Design Matrix with Value Measurements Annotated.
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tion concepts which serve as design control mecha-
nisms. They allocate superior needs downward, to
end items intended to serve these needs. Thus, the
sum of user needs must be satisfied by the sum of
end item capabilities. Management is concerned
with the risk that this equation may not be met unless
they exercise decisions to assure they will be.
Simple step function metrics can effectively point
the way.
Repeating the process for subsystem decomposition
and allocation the end items making up B 2 have the
following values:
C l = 28 where Cla = 14
Clb = 14
C 2 = 16 where Cza = 14
Czb = 2
C 3 = 2 where C3a = 2
As shown in the Figure 10 example, the user states a
value rating for each defined need, using a scale of
10 for highest value and 1 for lowest value.
Intermediate values fall in between. In the example
shown requirement (ra) is valued at 4, (rb) at 8 and
(rc) at 2.
Based on systems analysis, the engineer has identi-
fied five major functions (fl through t"5) as needed to
satisfy the user requirement. How these functions
contribute to user requirement satisfaction are shown
by the dots at intersections of the (ra) (rb) and (rc)
lines with the vertical function lines.
To assign values to functions, each dot is given the
value of its source requirement. To establish a
functions value, add up its vertical dot values.
Thus:
fl = 6
f2= 8
f3 = 4
f4=2
f5 = 14
One reason that f5 is so high could be that its design
represents a centralized computation function that
contributes to performance of all other functions.
At this point a relative value for all synthesized capa-
bilities of a given design concept are established. All
originate from stated user needs and values. Notice
that the arithmetic method used amplifies the value
numerics that flow downwards from the user mission
requirements. Based on these value assignments,
management attention should emphasize end item C 1
of B e over C 2 of B 2. However, until the risk associ-
ated with the acquisition and delivered performance
of each end item is understood, management atten-
tion based on value alone may be misdirected.
While system value analysis is performed "Top
Down," system risk analysis is performed from the
bottom up. Consider the following axioms.
Axiom 1: Functional and physical performance of
systems and subsystems is only limited
by the capabilities of their end items.
Axiom 2: Systems and subsystems don't fail. Only
their end items do.
Axiom 3: End item risk is a function of its maturity
and past performance history. If an end
item's capability has not been demon-
strated previously within its intended
operating environment, it is risky.
Subsystems of the synthesized design are shown as
B 1, B 2 and B 3. Each is allocated the subrequirement
to perform all or part of the system functions fl
through fs. Again, allocated functional values are
added and the relative subsystem value,' _.come:
BI= 12
B2= 16
B3= 6
Axiom 4: Planning granularity is the most critical
requirement for early surfacing and
assessment of risk. End items must be
understood.
Given the above, the author suggests the use of data
as shown in Figure 11 as a tool for assigning a Risk
Index to the capabilities of end items as synthesized
for a new system. Note that the highest end item risk
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Risk Index* Risk Characteristic
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7-10
5-8
3-6
2-4
1-2
New Technology Required
New development: Technology exists,
but unproven for this use
New Design: Similar equipment in use.
None directly applicable to this need.
Design Upgrade: Similar equipment in
use: > 40% change required.
Shelf Modification: < 40% change
required.
Shelf Equipment: COTS: Only changes
as required for integration.
*Note: The risk represents your resources expendi-
ture to achieve the user requirement. The more you
must invest, the greater your risk of loss.
Figure 11. Risk Index.
End Item Maturity Characteristics vs. Risk.
characteristic is assigned a 10 while the lowest is
assigned a 1 or 2. A Risk Index equal to zero is never
used. End items assigned a value of 8 or higher
should be considered a candidate for R&D or Pre-
Planned Productivity Improvements (P3I).
Apply the Risk Index data of Figure 11 to the exam-
pled synthesis in Figure 10. Sample results are
shown in Figure 12, and are explained as follows.
. The value of a capability (V) multiplied by its
Risk Index (RI) equals the Management
Concentration Index (MCI). Management
should focus on capabilities that have highest
value and risk combinations, i.e., V x RI = MCI.
. Based on technology status, a Risk Index (RI) is
assigned to each capability. (See lower right of
figure.)
. The capability value assignment (V) and (RI) are
multiplied to obtain each end item capability
(V x RI).
4. Add the capability (V x RI) totals to obtain the
end item (V x RI).
5. Add the end items (V x RI) to obtain the subsys-
tem (V x RI).
The resultant data per Figure 12 could be normalized
to suggest that management attention for allocation
and control of resources for Subsystem B 2 be applied
as follows: C l = 43%; C2 = 54%; C 3 = 3%.
The same processes could be applied to Subsystems
B1 and B3 end items. Normalizing all data across
subsystems would result in relative ranking of all end
items to prioritize management concentration across
subsystems.
In a similar manner, subsystems could be ranked. By
continuing the flow upwards to the system level, a
system (V x RI) or MCI metric results. Given that,
alternative syntheses can be compared to determine
which one has a best change of being "least bad."
Also, the detailed metrics data provides an indication
of the plausibility of continuing with efforts for
detailed design of the least bad alternative.
The reader should understand that the above numer-
ics have only addressed technical needs risk assess-
ment. The process can be expanded to encompass
both cost and schedule parametrics as necessary to
support more robust management decision making
guidance. Economic rather than engineering deci-
sion theory provides the basis to such expanded
application.
Supporting Tools and Training
On average, no new tools are required to perform
what has been described. Most of the arithmetic
processes presented can be aided by basic spread-
sheets and a simple relational database.
Extending the technical risk assessment process to
encompass economic issues requires tools and tech-
niques that are generally unfamiliar to most systems
engineers.
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While new tool requirements are not a major issue,
the failure or inability by most of us to use existing
tools properly is a major issue. Some examples:
Checklists: Dozens exist in the literature that are
rarely used. Using them can reduce risk that derives
from errors of omission. They will jog the experi-
enced person's memory. For inexperienced people,
they stimulate questions and thought. Once an issue
is surfaced, resolution will be addressed. Most
checklists have been developed because of recurring
failures.
Specification Formats: When combined with their
descriptive instructions, they are a checklist. Don't
modify their content. Tailor your response detail.
27
Mark unapplicableitemsas N/A. That is a useful
dataelementto your reviewer.
Data Requirement Lists: Same value as the above,
with one additional thought. If an item of data is
necessary for decision making and future
product/system maintenance or change, produce it.
All else should be avoided.
Software Systems: Don't buy the latest because it's
there. The cost of training and equipment upgrade
can be prohibitive. Stay with what is "least bad,"
that with lowest risk.
Training is or should be a major concern, but most
organizations continue to regard training from view-
points that do not and cannot satisfy today's business
and program management needs. Some specific
issues of concern are:
Formal Training: Too many organizations continue
to provide training from a "Square Filing" view-
point. A person must participate in so many class-
room hours per year to be considered for advance-
ment. As an alternative, we should be training peo-
ple to help them make decisions about things they
are accountable for. Can it be that we don't know
what their accountabilities are or should be? We
should test every student in terms of how job perfor-
mance was improved (risk reduction) because of
classroom attendance.
Training Curriculum: Most training continues to
teach the basics. While important, these are not suf-
ficient, in today's business environment training
must be tailored to fit the student's working needs.
Basic theory, coupled with a generic classroom exer-
cise, is usually too vague for timely job application
subsequent to course completion. Solution of this
problem involves two considerations. First, empha-
size training of an Integrated Product Team (IPT)
rather than a general student group. Secondly, tailor
all training and classroom exercise to definition and
management of the IPT's joint responsibilities and
accountabilities.
Basic IPT training should emphasize teaching the
overall processes of Program and Systems
Management as required to meet IPT needs. This
basic training should be followed up with specialty
courses for the team after unique needs are deter-
mined as part of on-the-job training (OJT).
On-the-job Training: Tailored formal training with-
out the provision of OJT has been shown to be inef-
fective. The classroom exercise should be developed
as the OJT start-up exercise. Essentially it should be
the "plan for the plan" of the IPT to develop an inte-
grated IPT Project Plan after formal training. This
planning effort identifies the need for follow-on spe-
cialty training courses. The earlier discussions of
this paper outline a "plan for the plan" approach,
resulting in a capability for risk management deci-
sion making.
Mentor Support: All but absent in most organiza-
tions today, mentor support is proving to be a costly
issue for many organizations. It represents a form of
training that is impossible to formalize for two rea-
sons. When it's needed, it's needed now. And, what
is needed can only be derived from combining previ-
ous experiences. There are two approaches to serve
this need: retain some top quality "oldtimers" for this
purpose, or, be sure that the selected IPT/OJT
instructors can provide the service. A little of both
may be the best choice. Consultants are not usually
effective in this role.
Industry Lessons Learned
Over the past two years, the processes described in
this paper have been applied to several NASA, DoD
and commercial projects. In each case, formal train-
ing, OJT and mentor support was provided to an IPT.
Descriptive experience concerning each project's
results are beyond the scope of this paper.' However,
the following lessons learned are typical of each.
. A young team can follow the requirements of the
NMI-7120 and DoD 5000 series processes with
adequate training, OJT and mentor support.
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2. You can start process application in the middle of
a project.
. Positive results are achieved within six to 12
weeks of start-up; that is, by a next-scheduled
review.
. At the next-scheduled review, there is more
information on the scope of the effort and poten-
tial risk identification than by following the
"usual" process, for the same or less effort cost.
5. Processes can force identification of risk areas
that need to be addressed early on.
. Specification/product trees can define an analyt-
ical baseline for planning, even if initially incor-
rect.
7. Help is essential in determining appropriate
process tailoring.
. The process holds people accountable and relies
on hard data and metrics to determine perfor-
mance acceptability.
9. The process provides high visibility over issues
that affect interfacing projects.
14. In the beginning, some false starts will be made,
but that is part of the learning process.
15. Management must provide proactive support to
process implementation.
Failure Lessons Learned
Comparison of the Failure Lessons Learned in the
1980s with those from the 1960s showed them to be
basically the same. I concluded that something was
missing in how we were performing management.
A new analysis of the very basic requirements under-
lying the management process revealed that little if
any emphasis was given to the management of risk.
In general, it was observed that risk management
was conducted to fill a square. Risks were only
treated seriously when they had already been
incurred. Few if any programs addressed predictive
risk management.
A subsequent analysis of the Failure Lessons
Learned List in the light of predictive risk manage-
ment objectives revealed that some modest changes
to existing practice could yield significant return.
Following are some specific changes that have been
presented.
10. The Planning/War Room process provides an 1.
effective means for evaluators and management
to review work in process rather than waiting for
a scheduled review. Reviews are shorter and
fewer discrepancies are noted. 2.
11. Planning/War Room data appears more complex
and labor intensive than the usual process. It's
not!
12. Resource-Loaded Schedule and Life Cycle
Costing is not hard. It forces one to think about
what is being done versus what should be done,
and it surfaces uncertainty for early risk planning.
13. System/concurrent engineering is critical. End
users must be involved at start-up.
Risk must be taken in order to advance or
improve. The purpose of management is to sur-
face and avoid unacceptable risk.
Early and in-depth planning is the only tool that
can surface risk and thereby avoid reactive risk
management. You must plan to a level of granu-
larity that assures all remaining risk is affordable.
° If remaining risk is not affordable, but the goal is
valuable, consider an R&D or P31 program in
place of a Development/Production Program.
. Management must redefine their decision crite-
ria to choose the alternative that is "least bad"
yet still meets overall end user system require-
ments.
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. Systems engineering must be recognized as the
primary discipline that provides a common
thread among all program management disci-
plines.
. Simple mathematical processes can serve to sup-
port most v_lue/risk decisions involved in the
trade study analyses.
7. Process application rigor is essential to perfor-
mance of predictive risk management, •
8. Front end planning should be assigned only to
experienced and skilled personnel.
. All personnel should be trained to understand
their role in the systems engineering "Big
Picture." Such training provides the foundation
to the Integrated Process Team's performance as
required to carry out the Systems Engineering
process. The use of checklists should be a major
training thrust.
The results of the two studies have been presented
for independent assessments of why so many major
government programs are behind schedule, over
budget and often deliver products that fall short of
required operational capability. The studies were
conducted more than 20 years apart, yet the failure
reasons were basically the same.
Based on early study results, many changes were
made to existing management policy, practice and
procedures. Based on the more current study, simi-
lar changes are being made.
Comparative review of these new requirements ver-
sus the old revealed that the new practices are more
clear and streamlined, but that no substantive differ-
ences are evident. Thus it appeared questionable that
the next 10 or 20 years would produce any more
improvements than the last 20 years. Better training
did not appear to be the answer per se. Since 1970,
industry and the government have invested heavily
for this purpose. I felt something was still missing
from our approach.
A return to basic analysis of fundamental business
practice suggested this to be true. It was established
that the primary need for management was to avoid
risk in the Program Development and Acquisition
process. A review of old and new practice through
NMI 7120, the DoD 5000 series and other similar
policies, showed that risk was addressed poorly, if at
all.
This paper described a relatively simple approach
towards solution of the risk management problem.
The process is founded on the practices of our cur-
rent systems engineering processes. Field testing has
shown that predictive risk management is practical
and not too hard to perform by a young team, given
some simple checklist tools and minimal training in
their use.
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Program Control in NASA: Needs and Opportunities
by a Study Team of the National Academy of Public Administration
William E. Lilly, Project Director
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) has successfully managed some of this
country's most complex technology and develop-
ment programs. These successes have included the
application of sound program control processes. The
impetus for this study arose from the NASA
Management Study Group findings that, over time,
some program control tools and disciplined proce-
dures and processes had weakened. The Study
Group recommended that steps be taken to establish
a comprehensive training approach in program man-
agement, and, specifically, in program control func-
tions. This study looks at program control processes
within NASA currently in use, defines a "model" of
program control functions, and provides recommen-
dations on program control training needs and
opportunities.
In 1988, NASA Headquarters tasked the National
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to exam-
ine the processes and systems used to by NASA to
manage and control program and project activities.
Essential elements of a program control system
include program development planning and docu-
menting program requirements; integrated schedul-
ing; resources management; configuration manage-
ment; documentation and data management; estab-
lishment of essential baselines; and the conduct of
performance reviews. Specifically the NAPA study
was designed to include:
• Determination and definition of program con-
trol functions as currently practiced in NASA.
• Definition of a model of program control func-
tions for NASA.
• Observations on training of personnel.
• Generation of recommendations for training in
program control objectives and processes at the
basic, intermediate and advanced levels of pro-
ject management.
The impetus for a program control aspect of program
and project management training and developmental
efforts can be traced to a series of findings and rec-
ommendations on strengthening program manage-
ment and control functions, which were derived from
the Rogers Commission and the NASA Management
Study Group (the Phillips Committee) reports. In
reviewing the total function of NASA program man-
agement, the Phillips Committee found the weakest
area to be that of program planning and control.
Committee members commented that over time
NASA's use of program control tools and disciplined
procedures and processes had weakened. They rec-
ommended the reinstitution of a Program Approval
Document system and a revitalized hierarchy of pro-
gram/project status reviews against approved base-
lines. In addition, the Study Group recommended
that steps be taken to develop a comprehensive train-
ing approach in program management, specifically
in program control functions, that would be based on
real experience.
The significance of the program control functions
within NASA cannot be overstated. The success of
large and complex research and development pro-
jects depends on commitment, diligent and disci-
plined attention to numerous planning, resource and
scheduling variables, and the integration and balanc-
ing of complex, interrelated activities. Along with
the systems engineering function, the program con-
trol function is one of the most important activities in
successful program/project management.
Systematic and disciplined attention to the implica-
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tions of variancesbetweenplanned baselinesand
actualperformanceon developmentprojectsis criti-
cal to taking early remedialaction, reducingcostly
delaysandachievingsuccess.
The purposeof this study is to indicatethe areasof
needaswell asprovideguidanceto thedevelopment
of training opportunitiesconcernedwith program
control in supportof effectiveprogram/projectman-
agementin NASA. The studycould not havebeen
completedwithout the assistanceof NASA employ-
eesat field CentersandHeadquarters.Their contri-
butionshelpedthestaff to understandtheapplication
of project control functions at different Centers.
Specialthanksareowed to Frank Hoban,Program
Manager,NASA Programand ProjectManagement
Initiative,who providedtheAcademywith theenvi-
ronmentto pursuethestudy.
The Program Control Function
In NASA, a project "... is a defined, time-limited
activity with clearly established objectives and
boundary conditions executed to gain knowledge,
create a capability, or provide a service." Major
space research and development projects in NASA
typically include design, development, fabrication,
test, and flight operations. A program/project man-
ager is designated responsible for ensuring the per-
formance of all functions necessary for management
of the project. The three basic elements of the man-
ager's job are technical performance, cost and sched-
ule. The program/project manager needs to know
where the project is at any point in time and to iden-
tify and scope problems early. Program/project con-
trol, which aids the project manager in this regard, is
the total management process of establishing and
maintaining program baselines and effectively sup-
porting the project manager in meeting the overall
objectives of the project.
The combination of functions of program control is
an essential element of the program management
process. The establishment of comprehensive per-
formance requirements by systems engineering pro-
vides the details and parameters necessary for pro-
gram control to maintain a comprehensive, ade-
quately explicit and integrated program plan. This
plan documents and defines program requirements
and establishes the official baselines of program con-
tent, scope, configuration, schedule and cost. A com-
prehensive program control process includes proce-
dures for reporting and reviewing performance
against baselines; analyzing and synthesizing pro-
gram performance; evaluating alternatives; develop-
ing disciplined processes for considering, approving,
and implementing changes to official baselines; and
assuring positive feedback on all directions and deci-
sions. It also provides a uniform system of program
documentation and assures clear and consistent com-
munications throughout the program community on
program progress, status and issues. The integrated
operation of these functions furnishes the means to
determine the harmony of actual and planned cost,
schedule and performance goals during development
and fabrication by verifying whether everything is
occurring in accord with baseline plans. The larger
point is clear: a program control system requires sus-
tained attention to the system as a totality, rather than
as a group of parts.
Ultimate responsibility for the effectiveness of pro-
gram management control rests with top manage-
ment. Top management decides upon Agency strat-
egy, policy, and organizational and accountability
structure. The control system is a set of major tools
and procedures for implementing those decisions
and for forming coherent and defensible strategies to
cope with changed and changing circumstances. For
the most effective program management and control
to exist, an environment of accountability of organi-
zations and individuals needs to exist at the top of the
Agency. It should be clear to the entire Agency how
NASA intends to operate and what is expected of all
elements. Delegations of authority, definitions of
roles and assignments of responsibilities should
carry with them the terms of accountability.
Disciplined processes for obtaining required feed-
back on delegations and for measuring and system-
atically reviewing performance on programs and
projects should exist. The pattern of program
reviews against approved program baselines should
also be established at the top. This can consist of
separate reviews or be a part of the general manage-
ment review process, but a disciplined approach of
reviewing status against approved baselines by the
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Administrator and/or the Deputy is needed. The
strength of such an approach is that it allows Agency
leaders to directly, programmatically and effectively
keep tabs on the performance and potential pitfalls of
programs. This in turn enables top managers to iden-
tify and consider the implications of both "inside"
factors and "outside" factors, forces and trends
which are likely to have an effect on NASA and its
missions.
A number of characteristics distinguish NASA
research and development projects, including:
Uncertainty. Many of the processes and prod-
ucts to be developed will be undertaken for the
first time and all components require the per-
formance of advanced technologies.
Long lead times in development and fabrica-
tion. This necessitates concurrent development
of elements and subsystems and the fitting of
end products together. It requires a high order
of advance planning and detailed monitoring
and tracking, and increases the need for testing
(component testing, subsystem testing and sys-
tem testing).
• Size and complexity of projects and the large
number and dispersion of participants.
Persistent scrutiny of projects by the public, the
Congress and the scientific community. Not
only must the work be done well, the project
manager must be prepared to interpret, explain
and defend what is being done and why.
Practices and standards for public projects far
exceed typical industry standards.
Major Functions of Program/Project Control
The basic control functions for development projects
are planning, configuration management, schedul-
ing, resource management and data management. In
some cases, procurement activities and other busi-
ness management activities may become part of the
control function, as well as logistics and separate
activities for program analysis, management infor-
mation and program reviews. The combination of
activities included depends upon the size and com-
plexity of the program or project, the existing sup-
port structure and the preferences of the Centers and
the individual managers. Regardless of the individ-
ual functions, more than anything else in program
control, it is important for the personnel to see and
comprehend the totality of the job to be done and to
thoroughly understand the interrelationships and
interfaces of the subsystems and systems, as well as
the organizations and participants in the project.
Another important element in structuring and carry-
ing out program control functions is uncertainty and
the inability to completely eliminate it. Uncertainty
should be specifically considered in program plan-
ning, scheduling and resource planning.
Program Plans and Requirements
The development plan is the basic plan for execution
of the program or project. It is the top-level require-
ments document and the top-level implementation
plan. It is the single authoritative summary docu-
ment that sets forth the manner in which the objec-
tives shall be accomplished. It defines the program
organization, responsibilities, requirements,
resources and time phasing of the major actions
required.
Against this background, it is important to keep in
mind that good program management is a matter of
balancing different internal and external factors so
that performance is maximized over the longer term.
Program control interventions, if used correctly, help
to maintain this balance.
Program planning sets forth the development
requirements needed to establish and maintain an
integrated planning baseline of what is to be done,
how it is to be done and when it is to be done. It is
not a one-time process, since the development of
detailed performance requirements are not estab-
35
lishedatonepointin time. In additionto thetechni-
cal requirements,detailedmanagementandmission
requirements houldbeestablished.It is a continu-
ing processof laying out and ensuringa unified
effort in implementing the program, adjusting to
changingconditions, maintaining the program or
project developmentplan, and integratingongoing
technicalrequirements.Althoughplanningstepsare
laid out in a linearsequentialmanner,the processis
iterative.
Thetechnicalrequirementsestablishthework pack-
ages. The developmentof the project work break-
down structure(WBS), consistentwith the Agency
codingstructure,mayalsooccurin conjunctionwith
theplanningfunctionor it maybepart of oneof the
otherfunctions.OnNASA developmentprojectsthe
WBS will normallybeend-itemorientedratherthan
disciplineoriented.
Resources Management
Resources management includes the establishment,
monitoring and maintenance of obligation and cost
as well as the manpower baselines. Manpower con-
stitutes the vast majority of development costs, and
knowledge of status and trends are extremely impor-
tant. The reporting structure for cost should be
established and maintained with an emphasis on cost
phasing and cost to completion. Reporting systems
and selection of report items should be designed to
raise questions, not to answer them; the implications
are important, not the absolute value recorded. The
absolute value is useful only for historical and legal
purposes.
The planning of reportable items is usually achieved
through use of the Work Breakdown Structure
accounts. The structure and analysis of report impli-
cations should be correlated closely with schedule
and technical performance. The recording and
reporting of cost alone has little or no value as relat-
ed to performance implications in the future; one of
the main purposes of resource and schedule analysis
is to recognize implications and to reduce manage-
ment surprises. This allows for identification and
evaluation of "what ifs" and alternatives. The initial
and subsequent cost estimates must recognize and
quantify risks and uncertainties and provide reserves
and allowances for program changes. The require-
ment for uncertainties and risk is as vital to project
success as any other cost element. Having contin-
gency funds available and using them judicially are
integral parts of successful research and develop-
ment efforts.
If the contractor reporting structure attempts to
closely parallel schedule and cost reporting mile-
stones, extreme care should be taken that it is not
based on the assumption of equal value milestone
performance. This type of system can easily lead to
some misleading assessments. If such a system is
used, program changes can completely disrupt per-
formance reporting and require installation of a new
structure of report accounts and a long hiatus in
reporting. To base a system on an assumption of
continued program equilibrium would be a mis-
take-uncertainty is much more likely to be the
norn'l.
Configuration Management
The purpose of configuration management is to pro-
vide a disciplined systems approach for the control
of the requirements and configuration (normally
established by systems engineering) of hardware and
software to be developed and the process for change
consideration. The function basically consists of
four distinct practices:
Configuration Identification--The definition
and establishment of the total technical require-
ments (performance and functional) and the
detailed configuration definition and documen-
tation. Configuration identification is usually
established incrementally as design and devel-
opment proceed.
Configuration Control--The formal process
used to establish and control changes to the
configuration baseline. This control is effected
through a hierarchy of formal configuration
control boards established at the different lev-
els of hardware and software.
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Configuration Accounting--Performance of
this function "defines" the exact baseline on a
continuing basis and provides a clear audit trail
from the authorization of changes into the
affected documentation. It should provide the
single authoritative source for baseline defini-
tion.
Configuration Verification--Ensures that the
baseline configuration requirements have been
incorporated into contracts and are fabricated
and tested accordingly.
Documentation Management
Documentation management establishes data poli-
cies and responsibilities and procedures for identify-
ing, planning, selecting and scheduling a large vol-
ume of data. The data management system ensures
continual management review of NASA-generated
and contractually required documents, eliminates
any non-essential requirements, and assures only the
minimum amount of documentation necessary for
effective program management. The principal inten-
tion of the system should be to define the informa-
tion required, justify its need, and control the infor-
mation after it is generated.
Schedule Management
assure the end-to-end integrity of program control
data from its source in subcontractors to prime con-
tractors and subsequent levels of NASA. The
importance of early problem recognition cannot be
overemphasized: the ideal control system detects
potential deviations before they become actual
ones. The costliest aspect of a development pro-
gram is time. Slippages in a program schedule are
extremely expensive. A permanent record of all
changes and slippages should be kept to allow trend
analyses.
The primary steps of management accountability--
establishing objectives and baselines, measuring per-
formance against baselines, analyzing and evaluating
performance and alternatives, assigning action or
direction, and ensuring action feedback--are applic-
able to the management of almost any activity.
Some aspects of control functions such as planning,
scheduling activities, and managing resources are
also applicable in some degree on all NASA work,
including applied research and technology, science
tasks, and institutional management. However, the
collection and staffing of the full array of project
control functions are not necessarily appropriate for
all activities within NASA. The style of manage-
ment and types of controls require tailoring to the
particular objectives and problems of the individual
activities.
This function provides for the development and
maintenance of the master schedule and the detailed,
interrelated schedules covering the total program or
project to completion. It involves the requirement to
define the schedule format, content and symbols
used. A critical component of the function is select-
ing the key progress indices for measuring perfor-
mance and indicating potential problems. A system
of reports, reviews and action feedback needs to be
provided. Working closely with resources manage-
ment, the analysts must evaluate performance, syn-
thesize various inputs and implications, and generate
and evaluate alternatives. Plans and schedules
should provide for uncertainty and the unknown.
The integrity, reliability and discipline of the report-
ing system are essential. NASA should continually
How program control functions are grouped organi-
zationally is a consequence of a number of factors.
Nevertheless, it is clear that all of the functions and
their outputs need to be integrated. On a small pro-
ject, a project manager could possibly perform the
functions and integrate the data output. On relative-
ly large or complex development projects or pro-
grams, it is the opinion of the Academy team that
management control and synthesis of program ele-
ment progress and performance are enhanced by
grouping the functions. A model that lays out pro-
gram control functions suitable for most large and
complex development projects is shown in
Figure 13. This model assumes that program analy-
sis is an inherent part of the functions shown. As a
matter of preference, however, program analysis can
be handled as a self-contained function.
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I
Program Plans
and
Requirements
Resources
Management
Program
Control
Develop and maintain integrated planning base
and program requirements and development
plans; establish baselines of content, scope
configuration, schedule and cost; measure
performance against the baselines; analyze and
evaluate performance and alternatives; provide
and monitor the procedures for changing the
baselines; and provide the system of reports,
reviews and action feedback
Schedule
Management
Documentation
and Data
Management
Configuration
Management
Establish and maintain a
system (baseline) for a
series of development
plans and technical
requirements, setting
both the terms of
accountability and
performance
Establish, monitor and
maintain cost and
manpower baselines
• Establish reporting
and statusing
structure
• Correlate with
schedule and
performance
• Identify and evaluate
"what ifs" and
alternatives
Establish and maintain
schedule baseline
• Format and hierarchy
of interrelated
schedule covering
total program
• System of reports and
review
• Analyze and evaluate
performance and
alternatives
Establish and maintain a
uniform system of
documentation
Formal and disciplined
system for the
establishment and
control of baseline
requirements and
configurations of
hardware and software
• Configuration
identification
• Configuration control
system
• Configuration
accounting
• Configuration
vedficatton
Figure I3. Program Control Functions.
Current Status of Program Control in NASA
As part of this study, the Academy made an effort to
ascertain the current status and health of
program/project control functions and processes
within NASA. Interviews and discussions were held
in both Headquarters and Centers with Center
Directors, directors of flight projects, program man-
agers and personnel who play roles in program con-
trol functions. Discussions were also held with pre-
vious NASA program directors, some aerospace
industry officials and support contractors supplying
management services to NASA.
In Headquarters, the reinstitution of the Program
Approval Document (PAD) System has not moved
swiftly. Dale Myers, Deputy Administrator in 1987,
sent a letter with instructions for preparation of
PADs in June 1987. On March 14, 1989, a manage-
ment instruction (NMI 7121.5) was issued, which
required the specific development of 23 separate
PADs with provisions for adding or deleting projects
in the future. Approximately eight have been pre-
pared and approved. The Deputy Administrator is
holding meetings with program offices in an attempt
to tailor the format, content and level of detail of the
document, and to define the management processes
to fit the desired methods of operation in an orderly
and efficient fashion.
Since early in its history, NASA documented its
management policies and principles of project man-
agement as well as instructions on planning and
approving major research and development projects.
These instructions were canceled in the mid-1980s
when the PAD system was eliminated. Efforts have
apparently been made to reinitiate or replace some of
the canceled documents, but at this point, it has not
been accomplished. An understanding of how the
Agency intends to operate and what is expected in
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terms of project management approaches and tech-
niques does not currently exist within the Agency. A
common concern among senior managers at the
Centers was the apparent lack of appreciation of the
usefulness of such policy statements on the Agency's
operation.
General management status reviews continue to be
held at Headquarters. The current review system
provides for three separate meetings---one for Space
Transportation and Space Station, another for all
other programs and projects, and a third for institu-
tional activities. According to some attendees, these
reviews could not be characterized as disciplined
reviews of progress against established baseline
milestones and goals. However, program offices
participating in these reviews do characterize the sta-
tus and problems of projects.
The organization and performance of program/pro-
ject control functions within the program offices and
the development Centers have not materially
changed or improved since the Management Study
Group findings in 1986 and 1988. There have been
some changes in personnel and in the methods of
performing the functions. One trend appears to be an
increasing use of support contractors to provide
some project control functions including scheduling,
configuration management, data management, and
elements of financial operations. The degree of con-
tractor use varies among the Centers but the trend [in
1989] appeared to be growing throughout NASA in
all functions and activities in addition to program
control. The impetus for contracting out functions
was generally attributed to the need for supplement-
ing the limited availability of civil servants.
Discussion with one NASA support contractor, how-
ever, confirmed that contractors also had the same
difficulties in finding skilled personnel in program
control disciplines and were faced with a problem of
how to train their people and how to sharpen their
skills.
In reviewing the list of program control functions
with NASA Center personnel, the reviewers found
no disagreement that all of the program control func-
tions were required and should be performed on
development projects. Only two organizations had
essentially all of the program control functions oper-
ating together in one group. At Goddard Space
Flight Center the functions were all within the
Project Director's office reporting to the Deputy
Director for resources. Scheduling, configuration
management and data management functions were
performed by a support contractor and were under
civil service monitors responsible for the functions.
A discrete function for project planning was not
within the project offices. The Space Station office
at Johnson Space Center (JSC) is the other organiza-
tion having a fairly complete grouping of functions
under the program control division. In the other pro-
gram offices at JSC, program control functions are
not integrated in one group but are being performed
in one way or another in various organizations.
At the Lewis Research Center, steps have been taken
in the Space Station project to integrate resource
management, scheduling, and configuration manage-
ment in a program control organization. At the
Marshall Space Flight Center, there is a fairly con-
sistent pattern of combining scheduling and
resources management in a single organization in the
project offices. Except for the cases noted above, the
remainder of the NASA Centers and the
Headquarters program offices do not have organiza-
tionally integrated program control functions. The
functions are either not performed, are scattered in
various subgroups, or are done informally.
An Agency cost estimate is always prepared on new
development projects prior to evaluation and selec-
tion of contractors. However, there does not appear
to be a uniform procedure for recycling and validat-
ing new estimates after selecting the development
contractor. Rather, the contractor's negotiated bid
generally becomes the baseline against which any
changes are incrementally made. This is true even
though the contractor's estimate is usually consider-
ably lower than the government's estimate. The
rationale for the government's higher estimate in
most cases is quickly forgotten. Credibility begins to
be attached to the contractor's estimate, which is nei-
ther justified nor borne out by history. Since it takes
some time for deficiencies to become apparent, they
generally come as surprises and result in more cost-
ly schedule slippages. In too many cases a large pro-
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portion of the time availableto the staff of project
resourceand schedulemanagementgroupsis spent
on finding near-termfundingsolutionsto these"sur-
prises."
As ageneralobservation,too little effort is spentby
both resourceand schedule groups in analyzing
potentialproblemsor risks and in selectingcritical
reportablemilestonesthat could give someadvance
noticeontheprobabilitiesof problems.Closecorre-
lationsof reportablescheduleandcostperformance
data is desirable,but the critical indicesof perfor-
mancearenot alwayspreciselyalignedwith a hard-
ware-drivenwork breakdownstructure.
Thereis anapparentlackof emphasison laying out
logic diagramsor networkson projects,particularly
prior to selectingscheduleand resourcereporting
items. The researchersknow of no better way to
comprehendinterrelationships and interfaces of
efforts on components,subsystemsand systems.
Whenthesenetworksare laid out in time sequence,
critical schedule and resource reporting indices
becomemuchmoreapparentand risksareeasierto
assess.The specialvirtue of logic diagramsis that
they allow plannersto incorporatetime, resources,
andtechnologyinto strategies,thus linking temporal
horizonswith contextualchanges.
As ageneralization,reviewsat theCentersappearto
bemorestructuredtowardtheassessmentof project
performancethantheyareatHeadquarters.Manyof
thereviewsat the contractorplants,however,seem
to beprimarily scheduledvisits with fixed agendas,
and with large groups spendinggreat amountsof
time lookinga viewgraphs.It wasnotapparenthow
often site visits by project control personnelwere
madefor the purposeof assessingperformanceand
verifying theintegrity of reporteddataat its source.
Regardlessof how scientific the approachor how
sophisticatedthemanagementsystemandtoolsare,
thereis nosubstitutefor a simplevisualassessment.
Coordinationof thosesupplyingperformancedatais
essential.
Training
Traditionally within NASA, program control person-
nel have gained skills and knowledge through first-
hand experience and from their experienced supervi-
sors. Immersing themselves in program/project
research and development activities is still the most
common way of gaining project management knowl-
edge. Forming mentor relationships--working with
a person who can provide counseling, guidance and
advice--is also used to gain the skills and credentials
of program control. However, experienced program
control personnel are becoming fewer within NASA.
According to interviewees at the Goddard Space
Flight Center, in the past, many program control staff
first studied operations research or industrial engi-
neering, then acquired on-the-job skills and subse-
quently passed on lessons learned by various means.
Rarely did program control staff receive formal
training related to specific functions such as the
establishment and maintenance of a configuration
control or scheduling system.
NASA and contractors currently face difficult prob-
lems in recruiting experienced program control staff
due to a number of reasons, from limited career paths
to elimination of industrial engineering disciplines at
many major universities. As mentioned earlier, in
response to recommendations from the Phillips
Committee, NASA decided to formalize efforts to
help in the development and training of managers,
including program control personnel. Formal train-
ing will be provided in such areas as resources man-
agement, schedule management, and configuration
management. Analytical skills and the philosophical
and logical foundations of program control, howev-
er, cannot be learned just by attending classes. They
require application and the achievement of an end
result as well. Self organization, program interest,
ability to coordinate individuals and data, a ques-
tioning attitude, resiliency, sensitivity, imagination,
and practicability are other nonemperical qualities
that are valuable in program control work, but are
beyond the realm of classrooms. In sum, formal
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courses can only complement, not replace, hands-on
experience and the inherent qualities of key person-
nel. This is because analytical skills are, to a large
extent, embodied in people and institutions, not just
in physical objects like computers.
It is anticipated that formal development training
will be provided by both civil servants and contrac-
tors. There will be a core curriculum which will be
designed to serve business, technical and program
and project management staff as well as a series of
detailed courses designed for people who will be per-
forming functions in specific areas. It is expected
that the importance of integration of the program
control functions and synthesis of data, personal
responsibility and accountability, and disciplined
procedures will be stressed. How the courses are
structured and how consistent they are with the past
experiences and needs of trainees will have a strong
bearing on the prospects for success of the training
efforts. Equally important, however, will be the sup-
port of top management at the Centers and
Headquarters. Their interest will have a serious
impact on the outcome of the project. If top man-
agement is sensitive to and supportive of the need for
training and displays a strong commitment to the
training program, the probability of success increas-
es tremendously. Perhaps more significant is that if
top management is involved and accurately commu-
nicates its involvement, the entire effort will be per-
ceived as credible and worthwhile.
Recommendations and Observations
NASA has successfully managed some of this coun-
try's most complex technology and development
programs. These successes have included the appli-
cation of sound program control processes. The
basic concepts of program management and program
control have not changed, although computerized
systems have the capability to enhance the quality
and effectiveness of documentation, communica-
tions, evaluation tools and support systems. Much of
the new capability of tools and support systems have
been incorporated in NASA, but over time NASA's
use of the basic management control disciplines has
weakened. Strengthening program control involves
the improvement and utilization of certain disci-
plines, the existence of a conducive Agency environ-
ment and an understanding throughout the Agency of
the leadership's policy and objectives. The follow-
ing recommendations are oriented toward improve-
ments in program control processes and practices.
Enhancement of Agency Environment for
Effective Program Control
This study concludes that is would be extremely
helpful for NASA personnel to be aware of the
importance attached to program control functions be
the Office of the Administrator. This awareness can
result in the reinvigoration of program management
disciplines throughout the Agency. An effective
method of informing Agency personnel and contrac-
tors would be through appropriate issuances setting
forth Agency intentions for conducting its business,
expectations of all elements and policies and proce-
dures for program/project approvals, assignment of
responsibilities and the explicit accountabilities of
organizations and individuals. The following actions
would be helpful:
Issuance of Agency policies and processes for
the approval and conduct of projects, the
assignment of responsibilities and the terms of
accountability of organizations and personnel.
Establishment of regular performance reviews
against approved baselines of development
plans, schedules and cost appropriate for this
level of management.
Facilitation of rapid communications to and
from all NASA elements regarding program
control functions, tasks and feedback on action
assignments.
Development of Training Activities for Program
Control
The primary emphasis should be on understanding
the role of program control functions in relation to
and in context with the program/project manager and
other groups and functions of the program office, par-
ticularly systems engineering. Systems engineering
includes those activities required to transform mis-
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sionneedsintoacomprehensiveanddefinitivesetof
systemsperformancerequirements.It alsoincludes
the activities neededto define a preferredsystems
configurationand its detailedperformancerequire-
ments.Theresultsof theseactivitiessetmuchof the
baselinedetail for programcontrol functionsinclud-
ing program plans and configuration management
andparametersfor scheduleandcostmanagement.
Programcontrol is the total managementprocessof
establishingand maintaining the official develop-
mentplansandprogrambaselinesin amannerwhich
maximizessuccessin meetinga program'soverall
objectives.Althoughthefollowing topicsarenotall-
inclusive,somesuggestedprogramcontrol training
activitiesare(moredetailshownin theAppendix):
1. Philosophy,contentandcontextof effectivepro-
gram/projectcontrol.
2. Planninganddocumentationof requirements.
3. Contentandprocessesof configurationmanage-
ment.
Themostmeaningfulimplicationsfrom performance
datacannotbe drawn from the independentfunc-
tions,but rather,only whenthe dataare integrated.
For this reasonwe haveemphasizedthe integrated
understandingof the roles rather than skills and
tools. Tools and skills can be very important but
only whenoneunderstandstheir limitationsaswell
asadvantagesandknowswhentheycanbeusefully
applied. In thiscontext,emphasisonskill trainingis
important with regardto particular tasks such as
logic networks,a meansof focusing data for the
maximuminformationoutputandthepresentationof
interrelatedperformancedata.
Observations
Until conductingthis studyit hadnot beenapparent
to the researchersthe degreeto which NASA has
becomestaffedwith supportcontractorsasopposed
to careercivil servants.Onsitecontractorsappearto
now exceedcivil servants.Theimpactof thiscondi-
tion potentially can have seriousconsequenceson
NASA's programmanagementandcontrolcapabili-
ties.
4. Logic diagramsor networks.
5. Theschedulingfunction andprocess.
6. Basicsof primarymethodsof costestimating.
7. Resourcemanagementandcontrol.
8. Presentationof data.
The most important element in evaluating and
assessingthe statusof a project and providing pro-
gramcontrol is the understandingof theobjectives,
technicalcontent, developmentapproach,and the
interrelationships and interfaces involved in its
development.Throughoutthis report, theAcademy
researchershave taken the position that program
control is not a collection of the separatefunctions
thatcompriseit, but thatit isanunderstandingof the
plansandapproachandtheinterrelationshipsof the
functionsandperformanceof configuration,sched-
ule andresourcemanagement.
As stated earlier in this report, NASA projects push
technology beyond the current state of the art.
Traditionally NASA has had the civil service and
fabrication capability in its Centers to conduct the
appropriate depth of studies, examine objectives and
missions, develop the technical concepts for accom-
plishing missions, determine feasibility, and provide
the conceptual design. If it was decided to budget
and contract for the design and development of a
project, the inhouse capability existed to manage,
technically monitor, evaluate and direct such con-
tracted work. If technical problems arose at the con-
tractors' plants, the capability existed to help provide
solutions and correct the problems. Some of the
major objectives of program/project control are the
early identification of potential problems, avoidance
of surprises, provision of workarounds, and the abil-
ity to obtain help in providing solutions. This pre-
cept of the importance of early problem identifica-
tion assumes the availability of the technical capa-
bility to participate in solutions to such problems.
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Funding pressures on projects have continued since
the early 1970s, and less funding allowance for the
contingencies of the "unknown" has been the result.
As surprises occur and additional funds are not
available, schedules usually become the variable on
which short-term solutions to fiscal year funding
problems are based. The obvious result is an
increased run-out on total cost and shrinking credi-
bility.
With the increasing contractor staffing, NASA engi-
neers have less and less "hands on" experience.
Service contractors are increasingly being used at
Centers to perform project control functions such as
scheduling, configuration management and elements
of financial management. In effect, this is using con-
tractors to monitor the performance of prime devel-
opment contractors. This situation is leading some
NASA managers to question the Agency's continu-
ing ability to manage contracted projects and control
costs.
NASA remains responsible for the performance of the
work, but with a reduction in capability to influence
and correct performance. How well the Agency meets
demands relating to program performance has a major
effect on its ability to effectively run programs.
Appendix
Suggested Training Activities
The following topics are not inclusive in the sense
that they cover all items.
1. Philosophy, content and context of effective pro-
gram/project control.
• What is meant by "control"?
• An explanation of how the main functions
relate to each other.
• Importance of understanding the totality of the
project.
• Importance of understanding interrelationship
of elements and interfaces.
• Importance of ensuring integrity of reported
data to source level.
Importance of concentrating on the implica-
tions of reported data rather than on the factual
data.
• Anticipation of development difficulties and
changes in external environment.
• Continual assessments of "what ifs."
• Importance of a questioning approach.
• Requirement for disciplined processes and pos-
itive monitoring.
• Barriers to effective program control.
2. Planning and documentation of requirements.
.
• Importance of maintaining development plan
baseline.
• The necessity of a series of subsidiary plans,
actions and schedules.
• Documentation of requirements.
• Technical and program reviews and results.
Content and processes of configuration manage-
ment.
Importance of early development and docu-
mentation of configuration requirements and
preparation of a configuration maintenance
plan.
The systematic approach of defining and docu-
menting the detailed configuration.
Understanding of the need for incremental
identification as design and development pro-
ceed.
• The significance of positive control of changes
to configuration. Importance of evaluating
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impact of individual proposed changes on
operational capability and total cost.
• Importance of clear audit trail of changes and
maintenance of the exact baseline.
• Necessity for effective verification that base-
line configuration has been implemented.
Logic diagrams or networks.
• Understanding how to develop networks.
• Importance for understanding the total job and
the interrelationship of the components of the
job.
• Relevance of networks to effective analysis
and synthesis of performance data.
The scheduling function and process.
• Critical importance of identifying known and
potential development risks.
• Planning for the unknown.
• Understanding interrelationships and interfaces
of development processes and organizations.
Importance of selecting the critical indicators
of progress or problemsmthe most important
scheduling function.
Identification of indicators as far "upstream" as
possible from critical progress points.
The danger of becoming mesmerized with sys-
tems. The need to understand weaknesses bet-
ter than positive elements and to keep systems
as simple as possible.
The amount of time required for administrative
and decision processes. This time requirement
cannot be overlooked.
The costliest aspect of a R&D project is time.
Slippages are extremely expensive.
• Emphasis on early problem recognition.
• Importance of having only authenticated and
dated schedules.
• Maintenance of permanent record of all
changes and documentation of slippages.
6. Basics of primary methods of cost estimating.
Understanding of concepts, processes, when
each is most useful, advantages and disadvan-
tages: parametric cost estimating, analogy esti-
mates, engineering estimates ("grassroots,"
"bottom-up") and expert opinion or Delphi
techniques.
• Dangers of accepting contractor's negotiated
cost estimate without complete reverification.
• Importance of quantifying risks.
• Importance of provision for and use of
reserves.
Risks involved in using cost goals as incentives
in cost estimating and the use of "design to
cost" concepts on R&D operational systems.
7. Resource management and control.
• Establishment of a cost reporting system.
• Importance of correlating manpower reports on
R&D projects.
• Importance of integrating cost data with sched-
ule performance.
• Verification of end-to-end integrity of data
reported.
Understanding the contract structure, and
nuances of differences in definitions and accu-
mulation processes of prime and subcontrac-
tors.
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.
• Importance of onsite verification of data and
calibration of personnel supplying data.
• Reporting of data should raise questions, not
answer them.
• Trend analyses.
• Emphasis on run-out and cost to completion.
• Importance of continual work on "what ifs."
Presentation of data.
• Determination of objective or purposes of pre-
sentation: What is the message or information
to impart?
Determination of desired outcomes.
Avoidance of reams of cost, schedule or engi-
neering data. The need to focus presentations
and use only data which contribute to under-
standing context, significance and implications
of information. Detail can overwhelm strategic
choices.
Factual data may or may not be significant to
future actions or decisions even though they
may be important for legal or audit purposes.
The need to sequence messages in a priority,
logical or temporal order. The use of unam-
biguous language.
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Resources
Resources for NASA Managers
by Dr. William M. Lawbaugh
Book Reviews
Managing in a Time of Great Change
by Peter E Drucker
Dalton: New York, 1995.
In 1946, Peter Drucker redefined employees as
resources instead of expense or cost items in Concept
of a Corporation. Post-war Japanese reformers
adopted him as their business guru and guide, and
The Practice of Management (1954) took Europe by
storm. Due largely to his influence, institutions
began to re-organize around the flow of things to the
flow of money and now to the flow of information.
Like previous Drucker books such as The Frontiers
of Management (1986) and Managing for the Future
(1992), this book was "pre-tested" chapter by chap-
ter in magazines such as The Atlantic Monthly and
Harvard Business Review. It lacks flow and conti-
nuity, but the insights are certainly worth pondering.
For example, he says: "The current emphasis on re-
engineering is from the flow of things to the flow of
information. The computer is merely a tool in the
process." Post-capitalist executives are knowledge-
workers who must figure out what information is
needed and, "most importantly, what they do not
need."
Among his "five deadly business sins," Drucker
includes "feeding problems and starving opportuni-
ties." He calls problem solving mere "damage con-
tainment" and says only opportunities will produce
measured growth and tangible results. He has six
rules for U.S. Presidents, including: "Concentrate,
don't splinter yourself," but recent all-out efforts to
achieve universal health care or gay rights in the mil-
itary seem to have fizzled.
From his perch in academia (Claremont Graduate
School), Drucker can speculate on "The End of
Japan, Inc.?" and "really" reinventing government,
but management, not political science, is his forte.
He does admit, however, that two answers have been
wrong this century in dealing with social need. The
first answer was to let government solve social prob-
lems, but "society is becoming sicker rather than
healthier." The second wrong answer was formulat-
ed in his 1942 book The Future of Industrial Man,
that the corporation became a worker's "community"
from cradle to grave. However, "entitlements" and
"fringe benefits" are not his solution today. Rather,
echoing his Managing the NonProfit Organization,
written a half-century later, Drucker proposes: "It
profits us to strengthen nonprofits" such as AA,
parochial schools and private relief agencies to
address our social ills most effectively.
Peter Drucker is on more solid ground writing about
management. In team-building, he clearly prefers
what could be called "basketball" where few players
mold and work together quickly, such as at GM's
Saturn Division. Detroit and most American indus-
tries were built on the sluggish, inflexible "baseball"
team model, while Japan was more like "football"
where the boss or coach still called all the plays.
As for the "Change" in the title, Drucker says, "For
managers, the dynamics of knowledge impose one
clear imperative: every organization has to build the
management of change into its very structure." He
suggest three ways to do this: continuous improve-
ment of product, self or service; exploitation of suc-
cessful knowledge (new products, selves or ser-
vices); and organized, systematic innovation---every
organization's necessary core competence.
Education and School are at the epicenter of
Drucker's new information-based society for knowl-
edge workers. Yet, he says, "Management, in most
business schools, is still taught as a bundle of tech-
niques," such as budgeting and planning. As impor-
tant as there are, Drucker says, it is far more impor-
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tant in this age to develop "competencies,"like
working under pressure,learning how to learn,
knowing what to know, and being able to gather
organize and present useful information. When
Druckersays"we needto measure,not count," he
meansmovingawayfrom traditionalcostaccounting
to looking at value, quality and investment. "The
key is not 'cost' but 'cost-effectiveness.'"
In this competency-basededucation environment,
theknowledgeworker (a termcoinedby Druckerin
his 1959bookThe Landmarks of Tomorrow) requires
"a habit of continuous learning." Thus, for Drucker
at least, management is one of the liberal arts instead
of a social science. It is not "experience-based" but
rather "learning-based." Core competencies lead to
"being able to do something others cannot do at all
or find difficult to do even poorly," which should be
enough to carry us to the end of his predicted social
transformation in 2010 or 2020.
Multimedia for Decision Makers
by Jeff Burger
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, ! 995.
Managers and executives often wonder how their
communications can reach more people and become
more effective. "Multimedia" is the suggested
answer, but the decision maker needs to know how to
integrate the various media (text, graphics, audio,
video, interactivity) in the office and make it cost-
effective. That's where Jeff Burger's new book
comes in.
Multimedia for Decision Makers is an overview of
multimedia applications for managers, not techni-
cians. It is conceptual rather than technical, and it
affords a basic grasp of the possibilities and benefits
of using more than one medium in presentations,
trade shows, direct marketing, information manage-
ment, training and teleconferencing.
"Interactivity" is the key in space-age communica-
tions, according to Burger. It is often noted that we
grasp 20 percent by hearing, 40 percent by seeing or
reading, and a whopping 80 percent by doing.
Interactive multimedia enhance our communications
immensely, especially through the Internet and CD
ROM technologies.
Just as the Internet was at first a Cold War effort to
sustain bomb-proof communication, laser discs and
CD-ROMs were first used in military training, says
Burger, such as interactive learning for nuclear sub-
marine management, in place of bulky service man-
uals. Electronic kiosks incorporating graphics,
sound, modem transmission and vending are being
developed in California for everything from bill pay-
ment and driver's license renewal to state lotteries.
Space travel is made much more exciting (and edu-
cational?) through interactive multimedia simula-
tors. Some call it "edutainment."
Edutainment could soon involve videos and music
on demand, "smart" games, computer-assisted
research, interactive fiction adventures and even
home based shopping comparison, depending on
passage and implementation of new telecommunica-
tion legislation. As Burger points out, "throughput is
only as efficient as that of the smallest artery." In
other words, one burst of interactive multimedia col-
lapses when the fiber-optic cable feeds into a mere
copper line on your street.
What Burger does not point out is that much of this
"new" technology has been around for a long time,
but there has been little or no consumer demand for
it. Bell Labs, for example, introduced the
Videophone in the era of the Kelvinator, but con-
sumers preferred better food storage over showing
up on the telephone. The first facsimile transmission
was sent from Lyons to Paris in 1865, but no one
seemed to need it until recently. The USPS has aban-
doned its plan for user-friendly postal kiosks. We
still do not need or want the Videophone, apparently.
Nevertheless, Burger's books presents at least a
dozen alternatives to the typical viewgraph presenta-
tion, all of them feasible and economical.
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Silicon Snake Oil
by Clifford Stoll
New York: Doubleday, 1995
Subtitled "Second Thoughts on the Information
Highway," this book fills a void: "there's damned
little critical discussion of the implications of an
online world." Is the Internet oversold? Do networks
deliver on education? Progress? Is this the ultimate
revenge of the nerds?
Clifford Stoll is a planetary astronomer by training
who is offended by colorized and computer-
enhanced images of outer space sent online by
NASA, for example. He finds them fraudulent,
"since infrared images have no color," he says. He
also finds computers in the classroom "expensive
and semi-reliable," providing only flat, black-and-
white, one-dimensional info. They are, too him, as
useless as television. Books (like his?) do a better
job. "Learning is not easy," he declares, excoriating
"edutainment" devices.
Multimedia? "Wrong, since there's only one medium
employed: the computer."
Interactive? Nope, all the outcomes are, of course,
preprogrammed. "The experience is about as inter-
active as a candy machine."
Eye-hand coordination, at least? A neighborhood
game of soccer is far healthier, and a box of crayons
and a big sheet of paper far more expressive.
Educational? Researchers and creative folks publish
their best stuff in journals, and the gold online is hard
to distinguish from all the dross. Besides, CNN will
keep you better informed than the Internet.
A virtual community? Yes, but how impoverished
without a church, a cafe, a theatre, a museum or even
a corner bar. "And no birds sing," he adds. No chil-
dren, no hearth, no warmth.
Great jobs? "Well, no. Computer skills no longer
guarantee employment," he says. "Programming
jobs are easily exported," like hardware manufactur-
ing and software piracy.
Telecommuting? Talk about turning home with all its
distractions, into a prison, he asserts. And tell that to
your dentist or auto mechanic.
Email? Stoll finds faxes are cheaper, faster, better--
and more reliable, secure and universal, and with no
junk. Real (snail) mail is more personal and warm.
Telephone, too. He's met dozens of teenage com-
puter wizards who have never written a thank-you
letter.
Clifford Stoll is not your average troglodyte, Luddite
or computer dubunker. He was an Arpanet user long
before we had an Info Highway, and his first book,
The Cuckoo's Egg, is all about how he nabbed a
German spy ring on the Internet, which he now calls
"that great digital dumpster" of disconnected data.
The biggest loser in the online culture is the library
as we know it--an organized set of books and peri-
odicals. Yet, libraries are strapped because they have
had to invest in computer systems and software that
are soon obsolete. (Look at their earlier investments
in punch-card and paper-tape readers, reel-to reel
tapes, 78 rpm disks, 8 mm. movies, 8-track tapes,
and new books on tape, CD-ROMs, ASCII files,
FORTRAN, Basic, Word 2.3, etc.). Their hours are
shorter but wisdom is diminished.
Stoll distinguishes between wisdom and data.
Online you can find plenty of data (like drinking
from a firehose), little usable information, less
knowledge, and hardly any wisdom, since nearly
nothing before 1980 is digitized. Besides, who
would really prefer to read a book (or periodical) off
an LCD or CRT instead of real paper?
The Leadership Challenge (2nd. edition)
by James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995.
Tom Peters, in the Foreword to the second edition of
this thick (400-plus pages) new book, says:
"Management is mostly about 'to do' lists (can't live
without them!)" but "Leadership is about tapping the
wellsprings of human motivation." The '90s version
of that '60s word appears to be "empowerment."
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Posnerand Kouzes describehow their world has
changedin the pastsevenyearssincethe first edi-
tion. Powerhasshiftedfrom amaster-slavebusiness
hierarchyto a flattenedclient-serverof empowered
people. Like PeterDruckertheybelieveknowledge
is thenewcurrency,replacinglandandcapital. They
seelessloyalty andworkforcecommitmentbut also
less job security and more self employment, by
choiceor not. Theyalsosee,surprisingly,arenewed
searchfor meaningandsuggestthat leadersbecome
"more like trustedfriendsin this increasinglycynical
world." Paradoxically,the authorssay: "We're all
connected"in aglobal village,but also: "The world
isdisconnected"with morecountries,moreproducts
andmoreservicesinamarketplaceof smallerpieces.
They ask: "How cana leaderunite sucha diverse
anddisparateconstituency?"
Simple. Justapplythesame"five fundamentalprac-
ticesof exemplaryleadership"andtheadjoining"ten
commitmentsof leadership"found in the first edi-
tion, but with new lingo, fresh anecdotesand new
"personalbest" casestudies. In brief, hereare the
practicesandtheir dualcommitment,uponwhichthe
entirebookis based:
° Challenge the status quo by embracing change
and innovation, and by taking risks, but be will-
ing to accept and learn from any resulting mis-
takes.
. Inspire a shared vision. Dream of an ideal future
but also set others on fire by communicating the
vision clearly and vividly.
3. Enable others to act by building trust while giv-
ing power away.
. Model the way by personal example that is con-
sistent with shared values, and build team com-
mitment with frequent small wins.
. Encourage the "heart" of subordinates by cele-
brating team accomplishments and by recogniz-
ing individual contributions.
"Love----of their products, their services, their con-
stituents, their clients and customers, and their
work--may be the best-kept leadership secret of all,"
say the authors.
Actually, these five principles are the opposite of the
way traditional management operates. Most bosses
will expect employees to fall in line and make things
run like clockwork, but Item One calls for defiance
to the status quo, shaking up the organization.
Traditional management may tend to focus on the
short term if not present moment, but Item Two
gazes well into the future. Item Three has the leader
divest of power while traditional management may
seek rather to consolidate it. Cool and aloof tradi-
tional management behind closed doors may try to
rule by threat and fiat, but Item Four suggests lead-
ing by personal example. Item Five would be sound-
ly denounced by control freaks as sentimental hog-
wash, but Posner and Kouzes' leader serves and sup-
ports instead of command and control. Tom Peters
even goes out of his way to say that Jim Kouzes,
"like Winston Churchill, cries easily; he cares."
However, the authors present 36 pages of theory and
evidence of statistical methodology and scholarly
footnotes to prove they are not sentimental old fools.
Kouzes served in the Peace Corps and Posner sits on
the local board of Big Brothers/Big Sisters. Together
they also authored Credibility: How Leaders Gain
and Lose It, Why People Demand It (1993). The
subtitle of this book reads: "How to Keep Getting
Extraordinary Things Done in the Organization."
Dive Right In, The Sharks Won't Bite
by Jane Wesman
Dearborn: Financial Publishing, 1995.
Although Jane Wesman's new book is subtitled "An
Entrepreneurial Woman's Guide to Success," it is
chock full of good tips and advice for project man-
agers of both genders. The first three chapters focus
on getting started in a new business, but the other 13
chapters are filled with generous advice from a real
pro.
Jane Wesman was a publicity director for New York
publishers before she started her own public rela-
tions firm 15 years ago. From experience, she says
the entrepreneur needs courage, determination and
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energy to survive in a tough market. "Energy is key,"
she says, urging a low-fat but nutritious diet and rig-
orous exercise to "clear your head and think cre-
atively." Being well groomed also instilled confi-
dence.
For a woman, access to capital or start-up loans is the
biggest problem. She started at home by lining up
clients first and securing advances, but today she
could have tried a small business "incubator," a suite
of offices with common reception, telephone, fax
and copier, usually connected to a university or local
(county or state) government. She was wise enough
to shop around for the right lawyer and accountant
for "a good fit" before she retained them.
She spent a lot of time hiring just the right employ-
ees, too. Most new hires were cheerful and upbeat;
none of them was hired just for the money because
they would leave just as soon as a competitor offered
more. Generous benefits and incentives were
offered in lieu of more money.
To fight the "sharks" in the old boys' network,
Wesman joined women's clubs and organizations as
networking venues. She returned every phone call,
and she never held grudges; people appreciated her
thoughtfulness and often recommended her firm to
others. She offers the reader 18 tips in the final chap-
ter, her favorite, ending with "Be gentle with your-
self... Think about what makes you special and
what brings joy into your life."
The Road Ahead
by Bill Gates
NewYork: Putnams, 1995.
"Human history becomes more and more a race
between education and catastrophe," wrote H.G.
Wells in 1920. Seventy-five years later, Bill Gates of
Microsoft, arguably the wealthiest man in the world,
holes up in his summer cabin to bang out a draft of a
book on his PC in order to begin a dialogue on the
information superhighway, highway or road. He's
not sure.
If he were sure, we should all go out and buy his
book and invest in the stocks and commodities he
deems hot. No need to. The Road Ahead is surpris-
ingly simplistic, if not a bit self-serving.
Nevertheless, when a guy like Bill Gates or E. E
Hutton speaks, we should no doubt give a listen.
No single theme holds this book together. It is part
biography, part polemic and in large part pure spec-
ulation. He denounces the appropriateness of the
term "information highway" in the Foreword, but
uses it uncritically anyway throughout the book.
In essence, Bill Gates agrees with H.G. Wells--edu-
cation is the best, perhaps the only solution to the
bumps and potholes as we ride the information high-
way. Education will reduce our fears of emerging
technologies and will enable us to navigate better the
road ahead.
Perhaps her best advice is her first "sharkproof strat-
egy for success." Keep a journal, she says. Record
your feelings and impressions. The private journal
becomes her lessons learned.
From a colleague at Harvard Business school she
learned and kept "the notebook system." Buy one of
those marble notebooks, like grade school kids use,
the one you cannot tear pages from due to the thread
binding. List all the things you need to do on the
right hand page, and put meeting notes, reminders
and phone numbers on the left hand page. Like the
journal, this becomes a valuable record for retrieval
and reflection.
Education to Gates, however, does not mean formal
schooling. To him it means tinkering, serendipity,
cramming. His biodata is revealing. His best friend
(and later business partner) was three years older and
able to explain to inquisitive Little Billy how gaso-
line was made. Later, the teenage hackers with
pocket protectors read Popular Electronics and got
hooked on the Altair (a Star Trek destination) 8800
minicomputer and wrote a language (Basic) for it--
the rest is history. At Harvard, Gates cut most of his
classes and just crammed for the final exams. The
rest of the time was spent developing software and
then Microsoft. He dropped out of college at age 19.
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Nevertheless,"education"has more hits in Gates'
bookthananyothertopic. His mainpurposein writ-
ing the book is to educate,asa travel guide to the
road ahead. If he were the businessmanin Mike
Nichols' film "The Graduate,"his one-wordbit of
adviceto Benjamin(DustinHoffman)would not be
"Plastics"but rather"Information."
(especiallywhenhe tells thehistoryof Microsoftor
the story of his new house),but the Nov. 29, 1995
Newsweek cover story and pictures are better edited
and the October National Geographic much more
informative.
Video Reviews
Down the road ahead, Gates sees convergence of
television, the computer, cable and telephone into an
"interactive media server" for home entertainment
and telecommuting business. Out on the road he will
carry the "wallet PC" that not only dispenses "digital
money" but also sends and receives faxes, email,
stock reports and games. It connects to Global
Positioning System (GPS) satellites.
Conveyance of media depends, of course, on
telecommunications reform, and wireless technology
subsumes the Internet somehow. The CD-ROM,
however, is praised for its here-and-now potential.
He unabashedly plays the "Encarta" encyclopedia
disk (brought to you by Microsoft), but the real test
will be the CD-ROM that comes with the book. Will
"readers" discard the book and pop in the disk
instead? After all, that little Road Ahead CD-ROM
contains every word of the book plus an "interactive"
tour of the highway in business, home and school, in
brief video and briefer audio selections. There's
even an "Ask Bill" application, showing an animat-
ed Bill Gates sputtering glittering generalities. A
totally useless "web browser" connects you to sam-
ple a commercial online service like CompuServe IF
you have a modem. If you don't have "Windows
95," forget it. If you have a Mac, forget even the
CD-ROM.
In fact, most of The Road Ahead is forgettable. His
"Implications for Business" are neither fresh nor
original, his notions on "Friction-Free Capitalism"
are pie in the sky, and the last chapter, "Critical
Issues," covers issues that are not critical at all. His
attempts to arrive at a pricing policy for intellectual
property are as important as the government's
attempt to tax the Internet.
The Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite
(UARS) Mission
with Charles Trevatan
Goddard Space Flight Center, 1992.
The Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS)
Mission is described in this 45-minute video as
"tremendously successful" by narrator Lee Blasso.
It was delivered two months early, $30 million under
budget, and all systems functional properly in orbit.
The PPMI Lessons Learned and Shared Experiences
video features the last project manager, Charles
Trevatan, who took over in 1991 from Peter Burke
when he became Deputy Director of the Goddard
Space Flight Center.
The September 12, 1991, launch marked the begin-
ning of NASA's Mission to Planet Earth. The space
observatory was to study the Earth's upper stratos-
phere and mesosphere for ozone depletion during an
18-month mission.
Trevatan said the good news was cost control in
addition to performance and schedule, but especially
"dedicated people and organizations." Deputy
Project Manager John Donley agreed, noting "stabil-
ity of people" in this 11-year project that began in
1980, especially the scientist investigators. Of the
ten science proposals accepted in 1978, eight of them
flew.
Dr. Carl Reber, Project Scientist, added that the most
important aspect was mission philosophy: that this
was a scientific mission with the end-product as sci-
ence. A well-defined set of requirements assured
success a decade later.
Nevertheless, The Road Ahead is an easy read (or Trevatan noted that since this was a multimission
view, if you use the CD ROM) and mildly interesting spacecraft, the project showed cost savings up front.
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Also, "we knew the interfaces right off," he said,
referring to thermal, mechanical, etc.
Richard Baker, Deputy Project Manager for
Resources, said the UARS had an adequate flow of
funds throughout the lengthy project, partly stimulat-
ed by the passage of the Clean Air Act. With good
control of contract modification and requirements,
along with good interface integration schedules, "we
were able to avoid downtime with a full pipeline."
Ellen Herring, Data Systems Manager, noted the dif-
ficulty in trying to coordinate 20 remote analysis
computers in the U.S., France, Canada and England.
However, the team focused early on data system
activity and gave a three-day stress test for data
delivery bottlenecks. She found the "training mater-
ial too difficult to comprehend" and recommended
"modular training" as users are phased in.
The "tremendously successful" project was not per-
fect. The ISAMS founder from Oxford University
failed, due to bad lubricant in the bearings after a
change in motor type and circuitry. Also, a motor
clutch stuck on orbit after eight months. Trevatan
calls this systems failure a "design flaw" rendering
the motor commendable but not automatic.
This video was narrated by Len Blasso. Judy Grady
Hamburg was producer, director and scriptwriter for
Media Specialist Associates. Gene Guerny served as
NASA Technical Monitor.
The Cosmic Background Explorer
with Roger Mattson
Produced by Technical and Administrative Services
Corporation, TADCORPS, June 17, 1991.
"Lessons Learned in the COBE Project" was pro-
duced shortly after the highly successful launch and
early scientific data collection which shed light on
the so-called "Big Bang" theory of planetary devel-
opment and background radiation. Within months,
the COBE mission provided valuable data for
numerous scientific papers and changed the text-
books in astrophysics.
Project Manager Roger Mattson introduces the infor-
mative video with three challenges. First, COBE
was by far the largest Goddard Space Flight Center
in-house project to date. Secondly, COBE involved
instrumentation at a level of extremely high sophis-
tication, and the engineering challenge was great.
Thirdly, the pressure was on after the Challenger dis-
aster to achieve excellence. The Shuttle accident
also meant COBE would be launched from a ELV
rather than the Shuttle, and that the original budget
would have to be expanded.
COBE Project Scientist John Mather, who had con-
ceived the COBE mission as early as 1974, notes that
all scientific objectives were achieved or exceeded in
measurement of a 15 billion-year-old phenomenon.
COBE was launched nearly on time.
Deputy Project Manager Dennis McCarthy explains
how redesign for the Delta meant smaller volume
and weight for the spacecraft, and that in turn mean
rebuilding some disciplines at GSFC such as systems
engineering and better contamination control.
COBE Flight Assurance Manager Abigail Harper,
who came on during the final year of the 10-year
project, applauded the extensive reporting and docu-
mentation on the project. She advised that
Performance Assurance is accomplished best by
visual inspection on the floor as well as analysis of
documentation.
Earle Young, COBE Instrument Manager, describes
new procedures for contamination control and was
among those who noted difficulty with the matrix
organization, which is better for the institution than
the project, and which responds technically, but not
administratively, well.
Roger Mattson explains the solution: a Skunk Works
operation for the three dozen engineers who had to
redesign for a Delta launch in one big room. GSFC
had no such room, so eight trailers were hitched
together, later becoming home for about the same
number of Integration and Testing specialists.
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The SkunkWorks factory later becamethe COBE
"War Room" whereeachsubsystemschedule,man-
ager'snameandactionitem waspostedon the wall
for all to see.
ObservatoryManagerAnthonyFragomeninotesthat
the SkunkWorks conceptled to better control of
moneyfor procurementorders. He said the large
successof COBE was "team spirit" engenderedby
thesynergyof youngandold on thejob.
John Wolfgang, COBE Integration and Testing
Manager,said that despite a tight scheduleand
resources,it is so importantto "do it right" andnot
cut cornerson testing and analysis. Training and
mentoringwereconsideredvital aswell.
In sum, ProjectManagerRoger Mattsonpoints to
threemajor lessonslearned.First, establishground
rules up front, with rigorous WBS and SOWs.
Second, communications systems, internal and
externalwereextensive.An opendoorpolicy led to
monthly reporting systems,an electronicsstatus
reportweeklyanddaily teleconwith programman-
agersat headquartersto cut off surprises. Third,
technicaltestingprocedureson thegroundledto few
engineeringproblemsto besolvedonorbit.
Bendix Field Engineersprovided technicalassis-
tanceto this productionfor theNASA Programand
ProjectManagementInitiative.
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